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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff-Appellee, : Case No. 930778-CA 
v. 
JOHN B. TENNEY, : Priority No. 2 
Defendant-Appellant. : 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
Defendant John B. Tenney appeals his convictions for 
selling unregistered securities (12 counts), securities fraud (12 
counts), being an unregistered securities broker (one count), and 
employing unregistered agents (two counts), all unclassified 
felonies under Utah Code Ann. §§ 61-1-7, 61-1-1, and 61-1-3 
(1986). The convictions were entered upon jury verdicts in the 
Third Judicial District Court, in and for Salt Lake County, Utah, 
the Honorable Tyrone E. Medley, presiding. Tenney also appeals a 
restitution order entered upon one of the securities convictions. 
This Court has appellate jurisdiction under Utah Code Ann. §78-
2a-3(2) (f) (Supp. 1994) . 
QUESTIONS PRESENTED 
AND 
STANDARDS OF APPELLATE REVIEW 
The question whether Tenney was properly permitted to 
represent himself at trial is a threshold issue that also bears 
upon the resolution of the other issues on appeal. Accordingly, 
the State addresses the issues in the following order: 
I. Whether the trial court properly granted Tenney's 
request to represent himself. Resolution of such a request is a 
decision about which of two constitutionally-guaranteed yet 
mutually exclusive rights will be honored. Therefore, a trial 
court's decision whether to permit self-representation is 
deferentially reviewed on appeal for "clear error." State v. 
Drobel, 815 P.2d 724, 734 (Utah App. 1991). 
II. Whether the trial court properly denied Tenney's 
mistrial motion, made after the State had completed its case-in-
chief, in which Tenney alleged prosecutor misconduct in opening 
statement. A trial court's ruling on a mistrial motion is 
reviewed with great deference. See, e.g., State v. Hay, 859 P.2d 
1, 6 (Utah 1993); State v. Gardner, 789 P.2d 273, 287 (Utah 
1989), cert, denied, 494 U.S. 1090 (1990); State v. Speer, 750 
P.2d 186, 190 (Utah 1988); State v. Cummins, 839 P.2d 848, 853 
(Utah App. 1992) (all stating "abuse of discretion" standard). 
III. Whether there was "plain error" in permitting 
State's experts to testify whether Tenney's misstatements and 
omissions amounted to "material" misrepresentations under Utah's 
securities laws. "Plain error," argued on appeal when no trial-
level objection preserved the legal issue in question, is a de 
novo determination. "Plain error" requires the appellant to 
prove "error," "obviousness," and "prejudice," in order to 
overcome the presumption that the underlying legal issue was 
waived by the failure to raise it at trial. State v. Dunn, 850 
P.2d 1201, 1208-09 (Utah 1993). 
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IV. Whether there was "plain error" in the jury-
instructions. "Plain error" is explained under issue III, above. 
V. Whether the trial court properly denied Tenney's 
new trial motion, based upon an out-of-court conversation about 
the case, during a trial recess, between a juror and one of 
Tenney's friends. Normally, a trial court's ruling on a new 
trial motion is deferentially reviewed on appeal. State v. Pena, 
869 P.2d 932, 938 (Utah 1994); State v. Wetzel, 868 P.2d 64, 70 
(Utah 1993). But see Crookston v. Fire Ins. Exchange, 860 P.2d 
937, 938 (Utah 1993) (if new trial ruling turns on a legal 
premise, it will be reviewed nondeferentially). 
VI. Whether the trial court properly ordered Tenney to 
pay $39,000 restitution to one of the securities fraud victims. 
Restitution orders are also reviewed deferentially for "abuse of 
discretion." State v. Snyder, 747 P.2d 417, 422 (Utah 1987); 
State v. Twitchell, 832 P.2d 866, 868 (Utah App. 1992). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES 
Tenney has reproduced the following provisions in 
addendum A to his Brief of Appellant: U.S. CONST, amends. VI, XIV; 
Utah Code Ann. §§ 61-1-1, 61-1-3, 61-1-7, 61-1-13, 61-1-14, 76-3-
201 (1986); Utah R. Crim. P. 17 (j); Utah R. Evid. 702, 704. They 
will be so referenced, as appropriate, in this brief. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Tenney was charged with, and found guilty of, twenty-
seven counts of violating Utah's securities laws: He was 
acquitted on two additional counts (R. 192-97). Tenney was 
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sentenced to prison terms of zero to three years for each of 
those unclassified felonies, in a combination of concurrent and 
consecutive sentencing that totalled fifteen years. The prison 
terms were suspended subject to probation conditions (see R. 795-
99, copied in Br. of Appellant addendum C). 
Following a post-trial hearing, Tenney was ordered to 
pay a total of $92,950 in restitution to ten of the fraud victims 
(R. 2503-04, copied in Br. of Appellant addendum E). Besides 
appealing the underlying convictions, Tenney also appeals $39,000 
of the restitution order, involving one of those victims. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Tenney does not challenge the sufficiency of the 
evidence supporting the guilty verdicts. The State thus recites 
the facts in abbreviated fashion, and in verdict-favoring light, 
State v. Verde, 770 P.2d 116, 117 (Utah 1989), 
From 1986 through 1988, Tenney sold stock in a 
corporation called "Cellwest" (also called "ReCom") to a number 
of Utah investors; thirteen of those sales formed the basis for 
the charges in this case. Tenney, however, was not a registered 
securities broker or sales agent (R. 1399-1404; State's Exh. 94). 
In several instances, the stock sales were mediated for Tenney by 
Steven Rick Jensen or Steven Bowers, who also were not registered 
sales agents (R. 1059-60, 1064, 1119-20, 1311, 1340, 1358-60, 
1399-1404 (State's 94), 1638-40), Additionally, the Cellwest 
(/ReCom) stock was not registered with the Utah Division of 
Securities, as required by law (R. 1460-67; State's Exh. 93). 
4 
The investors were persuaded to purchase Cellwest stock 
by a common sales pitch, with occasional variations, as follows: 
Cellwest was in the business of renting cellular telephones to 
rental car customers (R. 1119, 1139, 1158, 1226, 1236, 1255, 
1266, 1295, 1312). Cellwest's stock would be "going public" or 
"coming out" on the open market soon (R. 1551-52), and its value 
would increase "substantially," to twice or more its sale price 
of $2.00 to $2.50 per share (R. 1120, 1140, 1159, 1202-03, 1236-
37, 1361, 2110-11). This sales pitch, sometimes accompanied by a 
written Cellwest business plan and brochure (R. 1141, 1161-62 
(State's Exhs. 36-37)), failed to disclose certain information 
required by law (R. 1163-64, 1204-05, 1228-30, 1238, 1475-78). 
However, Tenney spiced the deal by promising to buy back the 
Cellwest stock, six months later at the purchaser's option, at 
$5.00 per share (R. 1146, 1167, 1203, 1224, 1240, 1255, 1295, 
1312-13, 1339, 1362). 
Tenney's glittering promises about Cellwest were never 
honored (R. 1148, 1173, 1207, 1230, 1240, 1263, 1343, 1373-74). 
There was no evidence that Cellwest ever entered into any 
cellular telephone rental contracts with car rental agencies. 
Nor was Cellwest stock ever listed on any public stock exchange 
(R. 1208, 1173-74). Further, when asked to do so by several 
investors, Tenney (sometimes through spokesmen) refused to honor 
the buy-back agreement (R. 1173, 1207, 1240-41, 1300). In some 
such instances, Tenney attempted to placate investors by 
referring to vaguely-described delays in listing Cellwest on 
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stock exchanges, or by giving them additional Cellwest stock at 
no charge (R. 1170-73, 1209-11).x 
Tenney's activities were eventually reported to the 
Utah Attorney General's Office, which successfully prosecuted 
him. He now appeals, raising numerous assignments of error. The 
facts pertinent to those alleged errors will be set forth under 
the appropriate argument points of this brief. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
I. The trial court properly granted Tenney's request 
to represent himself. Tenney presented himself as well-educated, 
experienced in self-representation, and well-versed in securities 
law. He acknowledged his duty to master procedural rules, and 
further acknowledged the trial court's recommendation that he not 
proceed pro se. Under these circumstances, the trial court's 
ruling that Tenney knowingly and voluntarily chose self-
representation should be affirmed. 
II. Tenney's claim that the prosecutor committed 
misconduct in her opening statement also fails. Part of that 
claim is waived because Tenney never raised it in the trial 
court. The other part—whether misconduct was committed by 
reference to Cellwest investors not named in Tenney's criminal 
charges--was properly rejected by the trial court. Tenney 
demonstrates no abuse of discretion in the court's ruling that 
the reference was proper because it was made in reasonable 
investor Rocky Ulibarri was refunded his $1000.00 investment 
when his wife intervened on his behalf (R. 1322-23). There is a 
lesson in this, although not relevant to this appeal. 
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anticipation that supporting evidence would be admitted at trial. 
Nor does he demonstrate error in the court's ruling that because 
the State's other evidence was strong, reference to the other 
investors was not prejudicial. 
III. Tenney's unpreserved challenged to State's expert 
witness testimony fails because he does not prove "plain error." 
He focuses only on the "error" component, without meaningfully 
briefing whether such alleged error was "obvious" or prejudicial. 
Nor could Tenney prove plain error if he briefed it: admission 
of the belatedly-challenged testimony was discretionary with the 
trial court, no case law at the time of trial squarely prohibited 
the testimony, and the State's other evidence was powerful. 
IV. This Court should also reject Tenney's largely 
unpreserved challenges to various jury instructions. The only 
preserved challenge fails because Tenney improperly attempts to 
interject the common law doctrine of "agency" into instructions 
that defined securities "agent;" that term is statutorily 
defined, and therefore no common law-based modification is 
permissible. Tenney's six other unpreserved challenges fail 
because he uniformly does not prove the "prejudice" component of 
plain error, as settled precedent requires him to do. 
V. Nor should this Court find abuse of discretion in 
the trial court's denial of Tenney's new trial motion, raised 
when Tenney discovered that during a trial recess, a trial juror 
had a conversation with one of Tenney's acquaintances. While the 
conversation was improper, it was very brief, and Tenney's 
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acquaintance spoke favorably of Tenney. Therefore, the 
conversation caused no prejudice against Tenney, who only 
fancifully speculates to the contrary. 
VI. Finally, this Court should deny Tenney's partial 
challenge to the restitution order involving one of the defrauded 
Cellwest investors. Tenney's attempt to convert this issue into 
one of constitutional "due process" fails because he expressly 
permitted the restitution question to be tried by proffer. His 
claim that restitution should have been decided in a civil action 
also fails, because the legislature, in a statute that Tenney 
does not claim is unconstitutional, requires criminal courts to 
make restitution orders. And Tenney does not show clear error in 




THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY ALLOWED TENNEY TO 
REPRESENT HIMSELF AT HIS CRIMINAL TRIAL, AND 
TENNEY CANNOT EXPECT FAVORABLE TREATMENT ON 
APPEAL BECAUSE OF HIS PRO SE STATUS 
Having expressly invoked his constitutional right to 
represent himself, see Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806 
(1975), State v. Bakalov, 862 P.2d 1354 (Utah 1993) (per curiam) 
(Bakalov II), Tenney complains on appeal that the trial court 
erroneously allowed him to do so (Br. of Appellant at 53-61).2 
Self-representation must be allowed once a criminal defendant 
2Tenney had backup, advisory counsel from the Salt Lake Legal 
Defender Association, which represents him now on appeal. 
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"voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently" so chooses. Bakalov 
II, 862 P.2d at 1355. Tenney's argument, which this Court should 
reject, is that he did not voluntarily and knowingly choose self-
representation. 
A. The Standard of Review. 
In State v. Drobel, 815 P.2d 724, 734 (Utah App. 1991), 
this Court held that a trial court's resolution of a self-
representation request, encompassing the "knowing and voluntary" 
inquiry, will be reversed on appeal only if it is clearly 
erroneous.3 The caveat for such deferential review is that the 
trial court must apply the correct legal standard in reaching its 
decision. Id. See also State v. Bakalov, 849 P.2d 629, 634 
(Utah App. 1993) {Bakalov I). The typical legal error in such 
cases occurs when the trial court denies a self-representation 
request based upon the defendant's "best interest." See Bakalov 
II, 862 P.2d at 1355 n.l. No such error occurred in this case. 
Hence, the only issue is whether Tenney knowingly and voluntarily 
opted for self-representation. 
Inquiry into this issue, which encompasses a waiver of 
the right to professional counsel, necessarily entails review of 
a unique set of circumstances. In State v. Frampton, 737 P.2d 
183, 187-88 & n.12 (Utah 1987), the Utah Supreme Court approved a 
sixteen-point, federally-developed colloquy to guide this 
3In Drobel, 815 P.2d at 731-32 n.ll, this Court observed that 
the term "intelligent" is surplusage, representing whether a 
defendant "knowingly," i.e., with full information and 
understanding, invoked self-representation. Therefore, the State's 
analysis in main text deletes the term "intelligent." 
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inquiry. In Drobel, 815 P.2d at 732, this Court followed suit 
(the Frampton-recommended colloquy is copied in appendix I of 
this brief). Because the "knowing and voluntary" standard 
ultimately asks whether the defendant elected self-representation 
"with eyes open," Faretta, 422 U.S. at 835, generous deference, 
implicit in the "clear error" standard, is appropriately due to a 
trial court's resolution of a self-representation request. Cf. 
State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932, 937-39 (Utah 1994).4 
B« No Clear Error. 
Dangers of Self-Representation 
Tenney argues that the trial court did not "advise 
[him] of the dangers and disadvantages of self-representation." 
Therefore, he continues, the court clearly erred in granting his 
self-representation request (Br. of Appellant at 54, 61). That 
argument cannot prevail. 
In fact, the trial court's colloquy with Tenney (R. 
2234-44, copied in Br. of Appellant addendum J), included proper 
warnings. The court observed that Tenney was not "informed and 
knowledgeable regarding the rules of evidence as it relates to 
criminal law issues, as well as the rules of criminal procedure," 
and inquired how Tenney would be able to "master those rules" as 
a pro se defendant (R. 2236) . The court warned Tenney that if 
4Tenney oddly states that his self-representation should be 
reviewed for "plain error" (Br. of Appellant at 59-60) . "Plain 
error" allows appellate review of a legal argument waived by 
default in the trial court. State v. Verde, 770 P.2d 116, 121 
(Utah 1989). Plain error analysis is not needed in this case, 
because the question whether Tenney should have been allowed to 
represent himself was not waived; the trial court ruled on it. 
10 
found guilty, he could be sentenced to over a hundred years' 
imprisonment plus substantial fines (R. 2239-41). Given "the 
serious nature of the charges," the court advised Tenney against 
self-representation (R. 2244) . 
The foregoing colloquy conveyed, "in essence if not 
verbatim," DroJbel, 815 P. 2d at 732, at least six of the 
recommended points about self-representation risks, covering 
potential penalties for the charged offenses, the necessity that 
rules of evidence and procedure be followed, and a warning that 
self-representation is unwise (see Frampton inquiries (d), (e), 
(g)/ (h), (i), (j), (1) and (m), appendix I of this brief). The 
record shows that Tenney had no difficulty understanding those 
warnings. He nevertheless asserted, "with all due respect," his 
desire to represent himself (R. 2244) . 
Tenney also argues that the trial court warned him too 
late that he would be required to present his own testimony in 
question-and-answer form (Br. of Appellant at 59). The court so 
warned Tenney at the end of trial day four, whereupon Tenney 
himself acknowledged the distinction between question-and-answer 
testimony and the "narrative" approach he hoped to utilize (R. 
1723-28, copied in appendix I). Tenney acknowledged the court's 
discretion, Utah R. Evid. 611, to decide how his testimony would 
be presented (R. 1725). That exchange makes it clear that Tenney 
was well aware, early in the trial, that he might not be allowed 
to testify in narrative form. Therefore, even if it would have 
been preferable to so warn Tenney before granting his self-
11 
representation request, see Frampton, 737 P.2d 187-88 n.12 
(admonishment (k)), that warning was unnecessary.5 
And because the admonishments in Frampton are 
recommended, but not mandatory, no single point therein is a sine 
qua non for deciding a self-representation request. Cf. 
Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 224-27 (1973) (no 
"talismanic" factor exists for determining voluntariness of a 
confession or search consent). In this case, the trial court's 
warning that Tenney would need to master evidentiary rules (R. 
2236) encompassed an expectation that Tenney would learn those 
rules sufficiently to properly present his own trial testimony. 
In sum, Tenney was adequately warned of the dangers and 
disadvantages of self-representation. 
Other Supporting Circumstances 
By other inquiries, the trial court further ascertained 
the Tenney knowingly and voluntarily chose self-representation. 
The trial court asked Tenney about his education, his experience 
as a pro se litigant, and his understanding about the "beyond 
reasonable doubt" standard for criminal guilt {Frampton inquiries 
(a), (b)). Tenney replied that he held a master's degree in 
business administration, and that he had represented himself in 
civil lawsuits related to other securities transactions (R. 2234, 
5Tenney's exchange with the trial court revealed a tactical 
reason for representing himself: "I would prefer the narrative 
approach simply because I want to impress the Jury with the fact 
that I am pro se" (R. 1724) . In fact, he argued this point to the 
jury (R. 2180-83). This also supports the conclusion that Tenney 
knowingly and voluntarily invoked his self-representation right. 
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2235). While admitting that he was "certainly not an expert in 
the law," Tenney asserted that he knew the facts of the.case 
better than the public defender whose services were offered to 
him, and that he was "a very quick study" regarding procedure (R. 
2236-37). 
Tenney further asserted, "I do understand securities 
laws because I have studied them extensively" (R. 2236) . Under 
that law, Tenney expressed his intention to pursue the arguable 
defense that he lacked the necessary intent, or "security law 
scienter" to defraud his Cellwest investors (R. 2237); in fact, 
his defense centered on the asserted non-willfulness of his 
actions (R. 2183-84 ("'willfully' is the word on which I will win 
or lose this case, period")). See DroJbel, 815 P.2d at 735 
(defendant's recognition of legitimate defenses supported finding 
that he knowingly exercised self-representation right). Tenney 
concluded, "I believe I am not over-matched in this case because 
I come into court with a great deal of facts and the law on my 
side" (R. 2237). Under all these circumstances, the trial court 
properly, albeit tacitly, found that Tenney knowingly and 
voluntarily chose self-representation. See id. at 734 & n.20 
("knowing and voluntary" ruling inferred within grant of self-
representation request). 
Based upon its colloquy with Tenney, the trial court 
was probably accurate in commenting that it had "no choice" but 
to grant Tenney's self-representation request (R. 2244); the 
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request was knowingly and voluntarily made. Bakalov II, 862 P.2d 
at 1355. This Court should affirm the grant of that request. 
C. No Favorable Appellate Treatment. 
There is an additional consequence--more accurately, 
lack of consequence--that flows from the affirmance of Tenney's 
self-representation request. This Court should reject Tenney's 
implicit suggestion that because he proceeded pro se at trial, 
settled principles of waiver and default should be relaxed for 
his benefit on appeal. See, e.g., Br. of Appellant at 24 n.2 
(prosecutor and trial court should have limited State's evidence 
on behalf of "Tenney, a pro se defendant"); id. at 44 (arguing 
plain error "in the context of this pro se case"). For two 
reasons, that suggestion is incorrect. 
First, because Tenney cannot argue his own 
ineffectiveness as counsel, Faretta, 422 U.S. at 834-35 n.46, 
Frampton, 737 P.2d at 189, he ought not be allowed more leniency 
to argue "plain error." The doctrines of counsel ineffectiveness 
and plain error can allow appellate relief from legal errors that 
were waived by default at trial; however, both doctrines require 
the appellant to carry a heavy burden of proof. Parsons v. 
Barnes, 871 P.2d 516, 523 (Utah 1994); State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 
1201, 1208-09 (Utah 1993). This Court ought not lighten Tenney's 
appellate burden of proving plain error: to do so would permit 
him an improper end run around the bar against arguing "pro se 
ineffectiveness.ff 
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Second, in this case Tenney affirmatively claimed that 
he had particular expertise in securities law, that he was a 
"quick study" who would easily learn trial procedure, and that he 
had thorough factual knowledge of the transactions that were the 
subject of his prosecution. In hindsight, those claims may seem 
unwise. Cf. Drobel, 815 P.2d at 734-35. However, the self-
representation right is not based upon fair trial concerns; 
rather, it embodies the criminal defendant's "personal right to 
be a fool." Id. at 736 (quoting State v. Hoff, 31 Wash. App. 
809, 644 P.2d 763, 764 (1982)). This Court ought not relieve 
Tenney of the natural consequences of voluntary choice. 
Among those consequences is the waiver, on appeal, of 
legal arguments not raised in the trial court. That bar should 
be as high for Tenney as it is for a professionally-represented 
defendant. In the points that follow, the State asserts that bar 
where applicable, and addresses his "plain error" arguments no 
differently than if Tenney had been professionally represented at 
trial. We ask this Court to do the same. 
POINT TWO 
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY REJECTED TENNEY'S 
BELATED OBJECTION TO THE PROSECUTOR'S OPENING 
STATEMENT 
In his opening point on appeal, Tenney argues that the 
prosecutor committed "misconduct" by referring, in opening 
statement, to Cellwest investors other than those who were the 
subject of the prosecution, and to the total money invested by 
all the investors. The reference was as follows: 
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Ladies and gentlemen, good afternoon. This 
is a case about innocent, hard-working people who 
got taken in a securities scam. They got taken by 
a smooth-talking salesman who sold them stock that 
wasn't worth the paper it was written on. The 
defendant, John Tenney, deliberately defrauded 
dozens of decent people, 333 people, mostly 
citizens of Utah, bought Cellwest stock for 
somewhere between 4 million and $11 million. So 
the State has charged him with 29 counts of 
violating the Utah Blue Sky Law. That is the Utah 
Uniform Securities Act, and we will talk about the 
Blue Sky Law a little bit later. While Tenney was 
collecting all of that money, investors were 
losing their shirts. 
(R. 998). Tenney also complains that the prosecutor's opening 
statement description of the loss suffered by one Cellwest 
investor, James Zieglowsky, was improper "victim impact evidence" 
(Br. of Appellant at 19-20). 
Tenney did not object to the above statements when they 
were made. However, soon thereafter, during Tenney's opening 
statement, the trial court admonished the jury that statements 
and arguments of counsel are not evidence: 
Let me give you this admonition. Whether it be 
the State's opening statement, Mr. Tenney's 
opening statement, the closing statements that you 
are going to hear at the end of the case, as well 
as the closing rebuttal argument, it is important 
for you to understand that those statements in and 
of themselves are not evidence in this particular 
case. Those statements are solely designed to 
assist you in understanding and interpreting what 
you believe the evidence to be. 
(R. 1097). That admonition was repeated during Tenney's closing 
argument (R. 2182), and in the jury instructions (R. 689). 
Tenney did not object to the prosecutor's opening 
statement until three trial days after it was made, when he moved 
for a mistrial after the State had completed its case-in-chief 
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(R. 579-80, 1671-81 (copied in appendix II of this brief)). As 
ground for his motion, Tenney asserted the trial court's 
exclusion, well after opening statements, of the State's list of 
all Cellwest investors (R. 579-80, 1672-73). The trial court, 
analyzing Tenney's mistrial motion under State v. Troy, 688 P.2d 
483 (Utah 1984) properly denied the motion (R. 1681). 
A. "Victim Impact" Reference: Waiver. 
Tenney's appellate challenge to the prosecutor's 
"victim impact" reference--i.e., the description of James 
Zieglowsky's financial loss--fails because Tenney never 
challenged that reference in the trial court. His mistrial 
motion assailed only the statements about the number of Cellwest 
investors (see appendix II). Therefore, the trial court never 
had an opportunity to rule on the "victim impact" reference. See 
State v. Johnson, 821 P.2d 1150, 1161 (Utah 1991). On appeal, 
Tenney briefs no exception to the waiver bar against this 
challenge; therefore, this Court should reject it. See State v. 
Lopez, 886 P.2d 1105, 1113 (Utah 1994); U.S. Xpress, Inc. v. 
State Tax Comm'n, 886 P.2d 1115, 1119 (Utah App. 1994) ("It is 
well settled that, absent extraordinary circumstances or plain 
error, issues cannot be raised for the first time on appeal"). 
B. "Other Investors" Reference: No Abuse of Discretion.. 
However, the trial court did reach the merits of 
Tenney's belated challenge to the prosecutor's statement about 
Cellwest investors not involved in this criminal case. It 
therefore appears that this Court should address the merits on 
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appeal. See State v. Seale, 853 P.2d 862, 870 (Utah) (when legal 
issues raised first raised in a new trial motion are addressed on 
their merits by trial court, waiver is removed), cert, denied, 
U.S. , 114 S. Ct. 186 (1993); State v. Lucero, 866 P.2d 1, 
2 n.3 (Utah App. 1993) (same).6 
Review on the merits begins with identification of the 
standard of appellate review. As set forth in this brief's 
statement of issues, the law is settled that a trial court's 
ruling on a "prosecutor misconduct"-based mistrial motion is 
reviewed under the deferential "abuse of discretion" standard. 
See, e.g., State v. Hay, 859 P.2d 1, 6 (Utah 1993). There is no 
question that the trial court applied the governing legal 
standard, set forth in Troy, 688 P.2d at 485-86, to its 
discretionary decision: on appeal, Tenney himself invokes Troy 
(Br. of Appellant at 21, 23, 25). 
Troy sets forth a two-step, "misconduct plus prejudice" 
analysis of alleged prosecutor misconduct: (1) whether the 
prosecutor called jurors' attention to matters that could not 
justifiably be considered in reaching a verdict; (2) if so, 
whether the jurors, under "the circumstances of the case as a 
whole," were probably influenced by the prosecutor's remarks. 
688 P.2d at 486 (quoting State v. Valdez, 30 Utah 2d 54, 513 P.2d 
422, 426 (1973)). The second step includes inquiry into the 
6Sut see State v. Tillman, 750 P.2d 546, -561 (Utah 1987) 
(l![I]t is the rule that if improper statements are made by counsel 
during a trial, it is the duty of opposing counsel to register a 
contemporaneous objection thereto . . . " (emphasis added)). 
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strength of the State's case: the stronger the evidence, the 
less likely it is that the jurors were influenced by the 
prosecutor's remarks. Id. Applying Troy, the trial court 
properly denied Tenney's mistrial motion. 
No Mi8conduct 
First, the court legitimately determined that the 
prosecutor's remarks about the number of Cellwest investors and 
the total money invested did not involve matters that could not 
be considered by the jury (R. 1679-80). "Other acts" evidence is 
relevant to prove "motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, 
plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident." 
Utah R. Evid. 404(b); State v. O'Neil, 848 P.2d 694, 699-701 
(Utah App.), cert, denied, 859 P.2d 585 (Utah 1993). In this 
case, Tenney raised a "no intent" defense (R. 2183-85, 2237), 
making evidence of his other Cellwest securities transactions 
relevant, and thus presumptively admissible.7 
Unfortunately, the trial court excluded State's 
exhibits 88 and 89, which listed over 300 Cellwest investors, and 
were offered to prove Tenney's scheme and intent to defraud (R. 
1434-40, copied in appendix III). The court did not deny the 
State's argument that the investor list was relevant for that 
purpose. However, the court excluded the list upon determining, 
under Utah R. Evid. 403, that its relevance was substantially 
7Tenney also placed his other acts into issue when, during his 
opening statement, he described an allegedly similar, successful 
business venture: "That company was extremely successful. We had 
3,700 shareholders. The stock went from 10 cents a share to $25 a 
share. Went up 250 times in 14 months" (R. 1006). 
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outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice: "[T]his Court is 
of the opinion that while the evidence may, in fact, be relevant, 
Ms. Barlow, that the prejudicial effect of this evidence far 
outweighs its probative value" (R. 1439).8 
Under these circumstances, the prosecutor did not 
commit misconduct in her opening statement that there were over 
three hundred Cellwest investors. Having reason to believe that 
the investor list would be admitted because it was relevant, the 
prosecutor appropriately stated the facts that the list would 
prove. State v. Williams, 656 P.2d 450, 452 (Utah 1982). She 
had neither the ability nor the duty of clairvoyance to predict 
the trial court's subsequent discretionary exclusion of that 
evidence under rule 403. The trial court recognized this: 
Despite the fact that at this stage, anyway, the 
Court did not allow into evidence State's proposed 
Exhibits 88 and 89, which I believe are alleged to 
be Stockholders Lists, the statements made by the 
Prosecutor in this particular case, in this 
Court's opinion, was [sic] made on reasonable 
reliance that the evidence regarding those lists 
would come into evidence. 
And hindsight is always 20/20, obviously. 
And despite the fact that that evidence was not 
received, the Court is not of the opinion that the 
Prosecutor was attempting to call to the attention 
8Tenney never denied that the list, which had been maintained 
by his own office staff, reasonably reflected the number of 
Cellwest investors; he argued instead that it was not known to be 
perfectly accurate because "we have had some problems with our 
stockholder's list," and that there were "at least three or four 
versions of the list" (R. 1435, 1436-37). 
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of the Jury matters that were clearly outside of 
the evidence. 
(R. 1679-80).9 
The trial court also distinguished Troy, in which the 
prosecutor committed misconduct by repeatedly making irrelevant, 
prejudicial statements to the jury (R. 1680). In this case, the 
challenged prosecutorial statement occurred one time, and dealt 
with relevant evidence. The court therefore did not abuse its 
discretion in finding no prosecutor misconduct.10 
Attempting to prove an abuse of discretion, Tenney 
briefs at length the question whether "bad faith" is an element 
of prosecutor misconduct (Br. of Appellant at 24-26) . Because 
Tenney's mistrial motion never mentioned this question, and 
because he raises no exception to the rule of waiver, this Court 
ought not reach it. U.S. Xpress,, 886 P.2d at 1119. And as 
follows, the question need not be reached because Tenney fails to 
show prejudice caused by the challenged statement. See State v. 
Lafferty, 749 P.2d 1239, 1255 n.13 (Utah 1988), vacated on other 
grounds, 949 F.2d 1546 (10th Cir. 1991). 
9Thus Tenney incorrectly asserts that "the State apparently 
knew at the time it made its opening statement that the list was 
not admissible" (Br. of Appellant at 20 n.l). The trial court 
found to the contrary. 
ioIn rpr0yt 688 P.2d at 485-86, the prosecutor insinuated that 
the defendant operated under an aliase, when in fact he had 
obtained a legal name change. The prosecutor also improperly 
alluded to the defendant's placement in a witness protection 
program, as well as to an apparent past criminal accusation against 
him. In closing argument, the prosecutor analogized the defendant 
to John Hinckley (attempted presidential assassin), and invited 
jurors to apply their own experiences in deciding the case. 
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Wo Prejudice 
The trial court also properly applied the Troy 
"prejudice" inquiry, finding no reasonable likelihood that the 
challenged prosecutor statement would sway the jury. Reviewing 
all the circumstances, the court found the State's admitted 
evidence to be strong, and observed that the jury had been 
admonished to not treat counsel statements as evidence: 
Troy basically says that when the evidence is thin 
and it's more likely that the jury is going to be 
swayed by improper remarks, then the threshold of 
prejudice is a little easier met. 
On the other hand, where the evidence is 
sufficiently compelling--and this Court is of the 
opinion that the evidence is sufficiently 
compelling. This Court is not convinced that the 
statements will have any prejudicial effect, 
considering the other compelling evidence that has 
been received consistent with the elements of the 
counts charged in the information. 
Also taking into consideration that the Court 
did give an admonition to the Jury instructing 
them, the fact that the opening statements made by 
the parties were, in fact, not evidence and should 
not be construed as evidence by the Jury. 
(R. 1681). 
On appeal, Tenney does not squarely challenge the 
foregoing ruling. Instead, he asserts in conclusory fashion that 
the allegedly improper opening statement "set the tone for the 
entire trial" (Br. of Appellant at 28-29). He overlooks the 
testimony of thirteen investors who bought Cellwest stock in 
reliance upon Tenney's misrepresentations of information that was 
significant to the purchase decisions (e.g., R. 1177, 1231, 1242, 
1268); the State's experts similarly opined that Tenney made 
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significant mispresentations in his Cellwest sales pitch (R. 
1468-78, 1596-1603. 
The trial court found that evidence compelling, and 
Tenney does not demonstrate error in that finding. Compare State 
v. Emmett, 839 P.2d 781, 785-86 (Utah 1992) (prosecutor 
improperly used the defendant's forgery conviction for purpose 
beyond impeaching his testimony; other evidence of guilt, in 
prosecution alleging sodomy upon defendant's child, was "not 
compelling"). Nor does Tenney question the presumption that the 
jurors obeyed their admonition to decide the case solely upon the 
evidence. State v. Menzies, 889 P.2d 393, 401 (Utah 1994), cert. 
denied, U.S. , 115 S. Ct. 910 (1995). Accord State v. 
Span, 819 P.2d 329, 334-35 (Utah 1991) (prejudice insufficient to 
require reversal, even though misconduct involved knowing 
violation of order to not pursue certain line of questioning); 
State v. Erwin, 120 P.2d 285, 313 (Utah 1941) (improper opening 
statement cured by repeated admonition that counsel statements 
are not evidence) .xl 
lxSee also Lafferty, 749 P.2d at 1254-55 (inaccurate comment 
about manner of murder did not warrant reversal because the other 
evidence of guilt was "overwhelming"); State v. Williams, 656 P.2d 
450 (Utah 1982) (improper argument did not warrant reversal because 
of defendant's testimony admitting that he committed the robbery in 
question). 
The non-Utah, non-controlling authority cited by Tenney is 
also distinguishable. E.g., State v. Echevarria, 860 P.2d 420 
(Wash. App. 1993) (repeated references to "war on drugs," and 
"battlefield of our own streets" improperly "set the tone for the 
entire trial"); United States v. Stahl, 616 F.2d 30, 32-33 (2nd 
Cir. 1980) (prosecutor made "persistent appeal to class prejudice" 
based upon the defendant's wealth). And State v. West, 617 P.2d 
1298 (Mont. 1980), appears flawed (prosecutor referred to expected 
hearsay evidence under "unavailable witness" rule, after the 
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To borrow his own adjective (Br. of Appellant at 23), 
Tenney's appellate effort to prove error in the trial court's 
ruling is "feeble." He alleges prejudicial error, but does not 
prove it. Therefore, this Court should affirm the denial of 
Tenney's "prosecutor misconduct"-based mistrial motion. 
POINT THREE 
THERE WAS NO "PLAIN ERROR" IN STATE'S EXPERT 
TESTIMONY ABOUT THE "MATERIALITY" OF TENNEY'S 
MISREPRESENTATIONS UNDER THE UTAH UNIFORM 
SECURITIES ACT 
Tenney next argues that two State's expert witnesses 
were improperly allowed to give their opinions whether Tenney's 
Cellwest sales pitch violated the Utah Uniform Securities Act. 
Admitting that he did not object to the testimony at trial, 
Tenney concedes that his appellate challenge must be briefed as 
"plain error" under State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201 (Utah 1993) (Br. 
of Appellant at 3, 5, 35). Plain error has three components: 
(1) error; (2) obviousness; (3) prejudice, i.e., a reasonable 
likelihood of a more favorable verdict absent the error. The 
appellant must prove all three components. Dunn, 850 P.2d at 
1208-09. Tenney has not carried his burden of proof. 
defendant's in limine motion to exclude same had been denied; 
appellate court ruled, after-the-fact, that prosecutor should not 
have referred to that evidence) . In United States v. Johnson, 767 
F.2d 1259 (8th Cir. 1985), the court disapproved an opening 
statement that characterized the defendant as "a thief," but found 
no "plain error," given that objection was not made until seven 
days later. Finally, in State v. Kenny, 319 A.2d 232 (N.J. App. 
1974), the appellate court condemned, in dictum, prosecutor opening 
statement and closing argument that "went beyond'the evidence and 
the indictment," id. at 241; the conviction was reversed on another 
ground, id. at 240 (the defendant had been granted immunity in 
exchange for his testimony in a related federal case). 
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A. Waiver of Appellate Argument. 
Most fundamentally, Tenney fails to brief plain error. 
He focuses on the alleged impropriety of the State's expert 
testimony--i.e., the "error" component of Dunn (Br. of Appellant 
at 3 0-35), and mentions obviousness and prejudice only as 
afterthoughts, in two brief sentences (Br. of Appellant at 35). 
His failure to adequately brief prejudice is especially 
surprising, because even errors preserved by timely objection do 
not warrant appellate reversal unless they cause prejudice. 
State v. Verde, 770 P.2d 116, 120 (Utah 1989) .12 
In short, Tenney fails to support this point of his 
appeal with the "argument" required by Utah R. App. P. 24(a) (9). 
Utah's appellate courts do not entertain such bare allegations of 
prejudicial error. State v. Bishop, 753 P.2d 439, 450 (Utah 
1988) (appellate court is "not simply a dumping ground in which 
the appealing party may dump the burden of argument and research" 
(quotation and citation omitted)); State v. Amicone, 689 P.2d 
1341, 1344 (Utah 1984) ("Since the defendant fails to support 
this argument by any legal analysis or authority, we decline to 
rule on it"); State v. Yates, 834 P.2d 599, 602 (Utah App. 1992) 
("This court has routinely declined to consider arguments which 
are not adequately briefed on appeal"). Upon this settled 
12Tenney's one-sentence "prejudice" claim asserts that the 
expert testimony "was prejudicial in that the expert witness 
instructed the jury that certain elements were established" (Br. of 
Appellant at 35) . That sentence simply substitutes the term 
"prejudicial" for "error." 
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principle alone, this Court should reject Tenney's "plain error" 
challenge to the State's expert testimony. 
B. No Plain Error. 
Tenney could not prove plain error even if he properly 
attempted to do so. He complains that State's experts Krendl and 
Nielsen should not have been allowed to opine that Tenney's 
misrepresentations about Cellwest were "material" under the Utah 
Uniform Securities Act--specifically, Utah Code Ann. § 61-1-1(2) 
(1986) (Br. of Appellant addendum A). He argues that although 
the experts could have testified that the misrepresentations were 
"important or significant to an investor," they should not have 
been allowed to use the statutory term "material" to describe 
them (Br. of Appellant at 30, 34-35). 
No Error 
This assertion of error fails because the admissibility 
of expert testimony is a matter of "wide" trial court discretion. 
State v. Larsen, 865 P.2d 1355, 1361 (Utah 1993) (^Larsen IJ"). 
Such discretion is allowed because there is no "bright line" 
between admissible expert testimony that "embraces an ultimate 
issue," Utah R. Evid. 704, and inadmissible testimony that 
"tell[s] the jury what result to reach." Davidson v. Prince, 813 
P.2d 1225, 1231 (Utah App.), cert, denied, 826 P.2d 651 (Utah. 
1991). Accord Owen v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 698 F.2d 236, 240 (5th 
Cir. 1983) ("[t]he task of separating impermissible questions 
which call for overbroad or legal responses from permissible 
questions is not a facile one"). In this case, the trial court 
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could have reasonably ruled that the experts' use of the term 
"material" did not tell the jury what verdict to reach; under the 
"abuse of discretion" standard, such ruling would not clearly be 
held erroneous on appeal. 
No Obviousness 
Nor could Tenney prove obviousness. Absent bright-line 
standards, improper expert testimony will rarely, if ever, be 
"obviously" so. Davidson v. Prince, relied upon by Tenney, 
stating that an expert cannot opine that a personal injury 
defendant was negligent, does not set "obvious" limits on expert 
testimony in a securities case, based upon a distinctive body of 
law. This Court's Larsen I opinion, State v. Larsen, 828 P.2d 
487, 493 (Utah App. 1992), held that "use of the term 'material' 
may be admitted as permissible fact-oriented [expert] testimony," 
and thus permitted the testimony in this case. Finally, Larsen 
II, which discourages use of the term "material" by experts in a 
securities case, 865 P.2d at 1361 & n.10, was not decided until 
December 1993--six months after Tenney's trial ended.13 
Therefore, even if experts might have erroneously testified about 
13Tenney's single-sentence "obviousness" assertion states: 
"This error was obvious under Larsen J, Larsen II, and Davidson" 
(Br. of Appellant at 35). 
In Larsen II, the Utah Supreme Court stated that the State's 
expert "certainly should have avoided employing the specific term 
'material.'" But the court then held that the expert's use of the 
term did "not mandate the conclusion that he was improperly 
instructing the jury on the law," and that the defendant's 
complaint about the use of the word "material" was "unduly 
formalistic." 865 P.2d at 1362. Thus the court did not squarely 
answer the question whether the experts could use the term 
"material," as held by this Court in Larsen I. 
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"materiality" in this case, such error could not have been 
obvious at the time of trial. See Dunn, 850 P.2d at 1208. 
No Prejudice 
Finally, Tenney could not prove prejudice caused by the 
State's expert testimony. The gist of the challenged testimony 
was that Tenney's misrepresentations were "material" because they 
"could have been important or significant to an investor," Larsen 
II, 865 P.2d at 1361. See R. 1471 (stating that "material 
information is the information that a reasonable investor would 
want to know in making an investment decision"); R. 1597 (opining 
that information is "material" when it carries "a substantial 
likelihood that a reasonable investor would find it important"). 
However, the Cellwest investors who testified at Tenney's trial 
also powerfully conveyed that information: each testified that 
Tenney's sales pitch, with its misrepresentations, had influenced 
the investment decision (e.g., R. 1177, 1231, 1242, 1268). That 
testimony gave the jury ample basis to find that Tenney's 
misrepresentations were, in fact, "material." Accordingly, had 
expert testimony been limited along the lines now urged by 
Tenney, there is no likelihood of a better verdict for him. Thus 
no component of "plain error" exists on this point.14 
14The non-Utah cases cited by Tenney are of f-point because each 
involves contemporaneous, trial-level objections, and thus "plain 
error" is not implicated. United States v. Scop, 846 F.2d 135, 142 
(2nd Cir. 1988), a securities fraud case, condemned an expert's 
"repeated use of statutory and regulatory language indicating 
guilt" (expert used the term "fraudulent manipulative practices" to 
describe the defendant's conduct, id. at 138). .United States v. 
Leuben, 816 F.2d 1032 (5th Cir. 1987), as modified, is academically 
interesting in that the Fifth Circuit therein held that the 
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POINT FOUR 
THERE WAS NO REVERSIBLE ERROR IN ANY OF THE 
JURY INSTRUCTIONS CHALLENGED BY TENNEY, MOST 
OF WHICH HE CHALLENGES FOR THE FIRST TIME ON 
APPEAL 
Tenney next raises five challenges to the jury 
instructions given at his trial. Conceding that all but part of 
his first such challenge were never made in the trial court, 
Tenney admits that they must be briefed for "plain error" under 
Dunn, 850 P.2d at 1208-09 (Br. of Appellant at 38, 42, 44, 49, 
51, 53) (the Dunn three-part test for plain error is set forth in 
Point Three of this brief). Once again, Tenney has not proven 
prejudicial error--plain or otherwise. 
A. There Was Neither Error Nor Plain Error in the 
Jury Instructions that Defined "Employing an 
Unregistered Agent." 
1. "Employed as his Agent" (preserved challenge)• 
Tenney's first instructional challenge asserts that the 
trial court inadequately instructed the jury on the elements of 
the crime of employing unregistered securities agents. As framed 
by Tenney, this challenge encompasses two subissues--one 
preserved, one not. In the preserved subissue, Tenney challenges 
instructions No. 41 and 42, pertaining to his employment of 
Steven Rick Jensen and Steven Bowers to sell Cellwest stock. In 
pertinent part, those instructions stated: 
question of "materiality" is decided by the judge, not the jury; so 
modified, the opinion upheld the prior judgment, 812 F.2d 179, that 
defense testimony about "materiality, " in a false loan application 
prosecution, was properly excluded. Owen v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 698 
F.2d 236 (5th Cir. 1983), involved testimony about contributory 
negligence, well off-point from a securities case. 
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In order for you to find the defendant, John 
B. Tenney, guilty of the crime of "EMPLOYING AN 
UNREGISTERED AGENT", as alleged in Count Twenty-
eight (28) [/ 29] of the Amended Information, you 
must find from the evidence all of the following 
elements of the crime: 
1. Sometime subsequent to April 17, 1987, 
in the State of Utah, John B. Tenney, a 
broker-dealer or issuer: 
2. Willfully; 
3. Employed Steven Rick Jensen [/Steven 
Bowers]; 
4. To offer or sell any security; 
5. To [the specified Cellwest stock 
purchasers]; 
6. When Steven Rick Jensen [/Steven Bowers] 
was not licensed as an agent with the 
Utah Division of Securities. 
(R. 741-42, boldface caps in original, copied in Br. of Appellant 
addendum K). Tenney preserved this part of his instructional 
challenge by asking the trial court to modify element number 3 of 
instructions 41 and 42, to state that he "Employed Steven Rick 
Jensen [/Steven Bowers] as his agent" (R. 374-75, emphasis in 
original). The trial court denied that request, evidently 
accepting the State's argument that the phrase "as his agent" 
would improperly import common law "agency" doctrine into the law 
that governs this case (R. 668). 
That decision was correct. Utah Code Ann. § 61-1-13 
(1986) (Br. of Appellant addendum A) defines "agent" for purposes 
of the Utah Uniform Securities Act, under which Tenney was 
prosecuted: 
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(2) "Agent" means any individual other than a 
broker-dealer who represents a broker-dealer or 
issuer in effecting or attempting to effect 
purchases or sales of securities. "Agent" does 
not include an individual who represents an 
issuer, who receives no commission or other 
remuneration, directly or indirectly, for 
effecting or attempting to effect purchases or 
sales of securities in the state, and who: 
(a) effects transactions in securities 
exempted by Subsection 61-1-14 (1) (a), (b), (c), 
(i), or (j); 
(b) effects transactions exempted by 
Subsection 61-1-14(2); or 
(c) effects transactions with existing 
employees, partners, officers, or directors of 
the issuer 
It is a black-letter rule that specific statutory provisions 
control over general ones. State v. Moore, 802 P.2d 732, 737 
(Utah App. 1990). Additionally, because Utah does not recognize 
common law crimes, see Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-105 (1995), it 
appears that trial courts have no authority to import common law 
elements into statutorily-defined crimes. 
Therefore, in this case, it would have been improper to 
add the phrase "as his agent" to jury instructions 41 and 42. 
All that the law required was that Tenney employed Jensen and 
Bowers to sell Cellwest stock, and that Jensen and Bowers, 
although not duly licensed, were "agents" as defined in Utah 
securities law. Tenney's proposed instructional modification 
would have confused the case by interjecting an inapplicable 
common law term; at best, the phrase "as his agent" would have 
been redundant. The trial court therefore correctly denied 
Tenney's request to add that phrase to the instructions. 
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2. Definition of Agent (unpreserved). 
In the second part of this instructional challenge, 
Tenney argues that jury instruction 45 did not fully define 
"agent" as set forth in section 61-1-13(2), above. Instruction 
45 defined "agent" as "any individual other than a broker-dealer 
who represents a broker-dealer or issuer in effecting or 
attempting to effect purchases or sales of securities" (R. 746, 
copied in Br. of Appellant addendum K). The instruction did not 
include the statute's exclusion of certain non-compensated 
persons, acting under the circumstances delineated in subsections 
(2) (a), -(b), and - (c), from the "agent" category. Because he 
did not challenge instruction 45 in the trial court, Tenney again 
invokes "plain error" (Br. of Appellant at 38-40) . 
No Prejudice: Tenney'8 Appellate Mistake 
Like his claim discussed in Point Three of this brief, 
Tenney again gives only single-sentence treatment to the 
"obviousness" and "prejudice" components of plain error under 
this point (Br. of Appellant at 39-40). Tenney's treatment of 
the especially-critical "prejudice" component deserves special 
mention, because it reflects a fundamentally mistaken view of 
plain error. Tenney's mistake defeats this plain error point, 
and all of his subsequent plain error arguments. 
Tenney mistakenly believes that he need not prove the 
prejudice component of plain error. That mistake is reflected in 
his assertion of prejudice under this point: 
[T]he error was prejudicial because the jury could 
have convicted Tenney of "Employing Unregistered 
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Agents" without making a finding that Tenney 
employed Bowers or Jensen "as an agent" as 
required and defined by the Act. See Dunn, 850 
P.2d at 1209 ("error was prejudicial because
 :[the 
Court] cannot be sure that the jury did not 
convict Dunn on the basis of a reckless mental 
state alone"). 
Br. of Appellant at 40. As his parenthetical quotation of Dunn 
indicates, Tenney espouses a "cannot be sure" standard for plain 
error prejudice; i.e., if this Court "cannot be sure" that the 
belatedly-alleged error did not affect the verdict, it should 
find reversal-justifying prejudice. 
That standard is incorrect. The "cannot be sure" 
standard, utilized by Tenney with no reference to the evidence in 
this case, is really equivalent to the standard for finding that 
preserved, constitutional error is harmless. Under such 
circumstances, the appellant benefits from a presumption that the 
error was harmful. To uphold the judgment, the appellee must 
prove that the error was harmless beyond reasonable doubt. See, 
e.g., Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24 (1967); State v. 
Verde, 770 P.2d 116, 121 n.8 (Utah 1989). 
But the correct standard for prejudice under "plain 
error," whether constitutional or non-constitutional in nature, 
is the "reasonable likelihood" or "confidence undermining" 
standard actually stated in Dunn, 850 P.2d at 1208-09. State v. 
Powell, 872 P.2d 1027, 1031 (Utah 1994); State v. Archambeau, 820 
P.2d 920, 922-26 & nn. 2-10 (Utah App. 1991). As explained in 
Point Three of this brief, even preserved non-constitutional 
error requires the appellant to prove prejudice under the 
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"reasonable likelihood" standard in order to win appellate 
relief. Tenney, who never alerted the trial court to the errors 
of which he now complains, cannot lay claim to an easier showing 
of prejudice than defendants who obey the contemporaneous 
objection rule. See Dunn, 850 P.2d at 1220. 
An understanding of "reasonable likelihood" comes from 
"counsel ineffectiveness" analysis, which (except for unusual 
situations not applicable to this case) utilizes this same 
standard for prejudice. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 
668, 694 (1984); State v. Verde, 770 P.2d 116, 124 & n.15 (Utah 
1989); State v. Ellifritz, 835 P.2d 170, 174 (Utah App. 1992). 
The standard requires that prejudice be a "demonstrable reality," 
and not mere speculation. Parsons v. Barnes, 871 P.2d 516, 526 
(Utah 1994). Like a defendant who claims trial counsel 
ineffectiveness, the plain error claimant must demonstrate how, 
in his or her particular case, the unpreserved error affected the 
trial court outcome. See, e.g., State v. Templin, 805 P.2d 182, 
187 (Utah 1990) (prejudice proven by demonstration that counsel 
mistake "affected the entire evidentiary picture"). 
Tenney apparently relies upon State v. Jones, 823 P.2d 
1059 (Utah 1991) to excuse his failure to brief plain error 
prejudice (Br. of Appellant at 4, 39). Jones is unavailing to 
him. Jones held that "the complete absence of an elements 
instruction on a crime charged" "can never be harmless error," 
and therefore requires reversal as a matter of law, even absent 
an objection in the trial court. Id. at 1061. 
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But Tenney's unpreserved instructional challenges do 
not involve a "complete absence" of elements instructions. 
Rather, he complains of the lack of instructions pertaining to a 
defense that does not apply to his case (this point), or of 
allegedly incomplete definitions of certain terms in other 
instructions. These are far lesser problems than existed in 
Jones, 823 P.2d at 1061, in which only an "information 
instruction" was given, causing per se prejudice. Tenney7s 
"plain error" arguments therefore require the case-specific, 
"reasonable likelihood" showing of prejudice, stated in Dunn. 
Returning to his challenge to jury instruction 45, 
defining "agent," Tenney's plain error argument fails because he 
makes no case-specific showing of prejudice.15 He makes no 
effort to prove that had instruction 45 included the statutory 
exclusions from the definition of "agent," a better verdict would 
have been returned on any of the charges against him. To put it 
differently, he proves no reasonable likelihood that the jury 
would have found Bowers and Jensen to fall within any of the 
statutory exclusions. For this reason alone, Tenney's plain 
error-based argument on this point fails. 
No Error, Nor Obviousness 
Were it proper to reach the question, this Court would 
find no error in the instruction's definition of "agent." It is 
15Additionally, Tenney's citations to non-Utah authority (Br. 
of Appellant at 39) cannot prove plain error as defined in Dunn. 
However other jurisdictions may define "plain" or "fundamental" 
error, they do not provide Tenney an end-run around Utah's three-
element Dunn "plain error" analysis. 
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proper to deny a lesser-included offense instruction when no 
evidence supports it. State v. Baker, 671 P.2d 152, 157-59 (Utah 
1983). It is also proper to delete other types of instructional 
language that is unsupported by evidence in the case. See, e.g., 
Anderson v. Toone, 671 P.2d 170, 174 (Utah 1983) (error to give 
"assumption of risk" language in a negligence case, when there 
was no evidence plaintiff knew about risks of activity in 
question), overruled on other grounds, Randle v. Allen, 862 P.2d 
1329, 1334-36 (Utah 1993). In this case, Tenney identifies no 
evidence that either Jensen or Bowers might have come within the 
section 61-1-13(2) exclusions from the definition of "agent;" 
instead, he simply recites that he asserted such a defense (Br. 
of Appellant at 38; R. 757). 
That failure is particularly fatal to Tenney's cursory 
"obviousness" assertion on this point (Br. of Appellant at 3 9-
40). The exclusions from the "agent" definition in section 61-1-
13(2) refer the reader to securities transactions falling within 
Utah Code Ann. § 61-1-14(1)(a), -(b), -(c), -(i), and-(j); or 
within section 61-1-14(2) (1986); or to "transactions with 
existing employees, partners, officers, or directors of the 
[security] issuer" (statutes copied in Br. of Appellant addendum 
A). These various statutory exclusions from "agent" are 
extraordinarily voluminous and complex. Even if Tenney might now 
isolate one such exclusion, and show that it is arguably 
supportable by the evidence, the trial court's failure to do so 
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sua sponte cannot be labelled "obvious11 error.16 Therefore, 
besides failing to show prejudice, Tenney's plain error challenge 
to instruction 45 fails because he shows no obvious error. 
B. There Was No Plain Error in the Jury Instructions 
Defining Tenney's Responsibility for the Actions 
of his Agents. 
Tenney's second instructional challenge asserts that 
the jury was inadequately instructed how to find him criminally 
liable for the conduct of Jensen and Bowers in making several of 
the Cellwest stock sales.17 He makes an unavailing "plain 
error" argument on this unpreserved challenge. 
No Prejudice 
This instructional challenge fails because Tenney again 
fails to apply the correct "reasonable likelihood" standard for 
plain error prejudice, as just explained. Tenney simply states 
that it is "impossible to determine" whether the alleged error 
had any effect on the verdicts in question (Br. of Appellant at 
43). This again, by itself, defeats his plain error claim. 
No Error, Nor Obviousness 
Were it appropriate to address error or obviousness, 
Tenney proves neither. He directs his challenge against 
instruction 52, which stated: 
16All Tenney does is assert, without reference to the 
applicable statutes or the evidence, that Cellwest stock was exempt 
from the registration requirements of the Securities Act (Br. of 
Appellant at 38; R. 757). 
17In his brief, Tenney refers to his responsibility "for the 
actions of Bowers, Jensen and others" (Br. of Appellant at 40, 
emphasis added). He does not identify the "others." 
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You are instructed that the Defendant is 
responsible for any statements made on his behalf 
by his authorized salesmen or agents in connection 
with any offer or sale of securities. In other 
words, if you find from the evidence that such a 
salesman or agent made statements to potential 
investors and that the Defendant authorized those 
statements, then under the law the Defendant is 
responsible for the making of those statements as 
if he had made them himself. 
Similarly, if any authorized agent omitted to 
state a material fact, in connection with the 
offer or sale of a security, and the Defendant or 
agent had a duty to disclose the fact, and you 
find that the Defendant did not inform the agent 
of the omitted fact, or did not take sufficient 
steps to ensure that investors would be informed 
of the material fact, the Defendant is responsible 
for the omission of the fact as if he himself had 
omitted it. 
(R. 753, copied in Br. of Appellant addendum L). 
Instruction 52 correctly states that Tenney was liable 
for Jensen's and Bowers' misrepresentations, so long as Tenney 
authorized them to speak for him. Additionally, Tenney does not 
acknowledge instruction 53, which stated: 
You are instructed that under the laws of the 
State of Utah a person is criminally liable for 
conduct constituting an offense which he performs 
or causes to be performed in the name of or on 
behalf of a corporation or association to the same 
extent as if such conduct were performed in his 
own name or behalf. 
(Emphasis added). Instructions 52 and 53 thus accurately 
conveyed the principles of criminal liability for the conduct of 
others, as set forth by statute: 
Every person, acting with the mental state 
required for the commission of an offense who 
directly commits the offense, who solicits, 
requests, commands, encourages, or intentionally 
aids another person to engage in conduct which 
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constitutes an offense shall be criminally liable 
as a party for such conduct. 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-202 (1995) IB 
A person is criminally liable for conduct 
constituting an offense which he performs or 
causes to be performed in the name of or on behalf 
of a corporation or association to the same extent 
as if such conduct were performed in his own name 
or behalf. 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-205 (1995). Tenney's effort to prove 
"error" in instructions 52 and 53 consists of an attempt to 
incorporate common law "agency" doctrine into the instructions. 
As already explained, it would have been improper to interject 
that doctrine into this criminal case.19 Obviously, then, it 
was not error to leave it out. 
C. There Was No Plain Error in Any of the Jury 
Instructions Defining Securities Fraud. 
Tenney next mounts a two-part, unpreserved attack on 
the instructions defining securities fraud. He first claims 
error in the absence of a jury unanimity requirement for deciding 
among alternative elements for that offense (Br. of Appellant at 
43-44). Next, he argues that the instructions failed to 
18The mental state required for securities violations 
("willfully")/ alluded to in section 76-2-202, was defined in 
instruction 54 (R. 755). 
19In fact, Utah's criminal code has its own definition of 
"agent," apart from the securities law definition: "'Agent' means 
any director, officer, employee, or other person authorized to act 
in behalf of a corporation or association." Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-
201(1) (1995). Neither this statute nor the * securities code 
definition of "agent" support Tenney's effort to interject the 
common law rule of "apparent authority" (Br. of Appellant at 40-42) 
into this case. 
39 
adequately define the phrase "employed a device, scheme, or 
artifice to defraud" (Br. of Appellant at 48). 
No Prejudice 
Both of those "plain error" arguments fail because 
Tenney again fails to brief "reasonable likelihood" prejudice. 
Br. of Appellant at 48 ("no assurance" that the verdicts were 
unaffected by absence of "alternative elements unanimity" 
instruction); id. at 50 ("cannot be sure" that allegedly flawed 
definitions influenced the verdicts). Once again, this Court 
need not consider the questions of error or obviousness. 
No Error, Nor Obviousness 
Were this Court to address error or obviousness on this 
point, it would find neither. The State addresses Tenney's two 
instructional subchallenges in turn. 
1. Unanimity Not Needed for Alternative Elements. 
Tenney sets forth an exemplar of the thirteen 
securities fraud instructions (one for each named Cellwest 
investor) (Br. of Appellant at 43). Element 5 of that 
instruction set forth several alternative ways in which the 
requisite "fraud" might be found: 
5. [That Tenney] either 
a). employed a device, scheme, or artifice 
to defraud, OR 
b). made an untrue statement of a material 
fact or omitted to state a material fact 
necessary in order to make the 
statements made, in light of the 
circumstances under which they were 
made, not misleading, OR 
c). engaged in an act, practice, or course 
of business which operated or would 
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operate as a fraud or deceit upon any 
person. 
(R. 713, also copied in Br. of Appellant addendum I). 
Tenney cites State v. Tillman, 750 P.2d 546 (Utah 1987) 
{"Tillman I"), and Tillman v. Cook, 855 P.2d 211 (Utah 1993) 
("Tillman II"), to claim that the trial court erroneously failed 
to instruct the jury to unanimously agree on which of the fraud 
alternatives in element 5 were proven. But the bitterly divided 
opinions in Tillman, a capital case, do not prove error on this 
point. Repeatedly, the Tillman opinions tied the jury unanimity 
question to legal concerns that are unique to capital penalty 
jurisprudence.20 In neither Tillman opinion did the Utah 
Supreme Court overturn its longstanding rule that in a noncapital 
case, jurors may be nonunanimous on alternative crime elements, 
so long as their ultimate verdict is unanimous. See Tillman I, 
750 P.2d at at 567 & n.74 (citing Utah precedent). 
Admittedly, in a subsequent case, the Utah Supreme 
Court, citing Tillman I, stated: "A majority of this Court has 
stated that a jury must be unanimous on all elements of a 
criminal charge for the conviction to stand." State v. Johnson, 
821 P.2d 1150, 1159 (Utah 1991) (attempted capital murder: 
20E.g., Tillman I, 750 P.2d at 566 (plurality opinion on this 
issue, citing and discussing Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 
(1972), and related cases); id. at 578-79 (Stewart, J., concurring 
in result on this issue, and rejecting non-unanimity rule "in 
connection with aggravating circumstances in capital homicide 
cases" (emphasis added)); Tillman II, 855 P.2d at 216 (stating 
Tillman I court's majority view that "jurors are constitutionally 
required to agree unanimously on each element of a criminal 
offense, including at least one aggravating circumstance in a 
capital offense" (emphasis added)). 
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"poison" aggravator not proven; court could not uphold verdict on 
alternative "pecuniary gain" aggravator absent special verdict 
showing that jury found it to be present). Even so, the court 
has not expressly overruled its pre-Tillman cases, e.g., State v. 
Russell, 733 P.2d 162 (Utah 1987), holding that unanimity among 
alternative crime elements is not required. Indeed, in State v. 
Goddard, 871 P.2d 540, 546-47 (Utah 1994), the supreme court 
invoked Russell to uphold a second degree murder conviction 
against an "alternative elements unanimity" challenge. Finally, 
one supreme court member (the swing vote on the issue in Tillman 
I), has criticized special verdicts in criminal cases, which 
would be needed to assure juror unanimity among alternative crime 
elements. See State v. Bell, 770 P.2d 100, 111-13 (Utah 1988) 
(Stewart, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (special 
verdicts may deprive jury of its "mercy" function).21 
Given this unsettled case law, even if it might have 
been error to omit an "alternative elements unanimity" 
instruction, such error could not have been "obvious" to the 
trial court. Quite the contrary, to the extent that the 
unanimity requirement, in its several contexts, has caused the 
Utah Supreme Court to "struggle," State v. Saunders, 893 P.2d 
21J2ussell contains an excellent explanation why juror unanimity 
on alternative crime elements is unnecessary: such a requirement 
would cause overlong deliberations and hung juries in instances 
when all jurors agree that the accused committed the charged crime. 
733 P.2d at 167-68 (citing cases). And in Schad v. Arizona, 501 
U.S. 624, 630-45 (1991), a United States Supreme Court plurality 
saw no useful purpose to an "alternative elements unanimity" 
requirement in a capital murder prosecution. 
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584, 589 (Utah App. 1995), no "obvious" error exists on this 
point. Absent settled, well-known, controlling precedent, there 
can be no obvious error. 
2. "Device, Scheme, or Artifice to Defraud.11 
Nor could this Court find obvious error in the absence 
of instructions defining "device, scheme, or artifice to 
defraud," one of the alternative ways of committing fraud under 
element 5 of the securities fraud instruction.22 Tenney 
asserts, without explanation, that "device," "scheme," and 
"artifice," taken directly from Utah Code Ann. § 61-1-1 (1986), 
are not self-defining (Br. of Appellant at 49). However, 
instructions given in statutory language are generally deemed 
sufficient. State v. Swan, 31 Utah 336, 88 P. 12, 15 (1906). 
Further, even on appeal, Tenney offers no guidance on 
how "device," "scheme," and "artifice" should have been defined. 
See Swan, 88 P. at 14 ("Counsel do not state, nor would it be an 
easy matter to define, just what should be stated . . . " ) . Just 
as failure to proffer an alternative instruction can waive an 
instructional challenge at the trial level, State v. Schoenfeld, 
545 P.2d 193, 196 (Utah 1976), such failure should also doom an 
unpreserved, "plain error" challenge. And as Tenney admits (Br. 
of Appellant at 49), Utah case law has never addressed the point. 
Thus even if error might be found, Tenney has not proven the 
"obviousness" component of plain error. Saunders, 893 P.2d at 
22Under Tenney's "alternative element unanimity" theory, the 
jury would be required to identify whether Tenney employed a 
"device," or a "scheme," or an "artifice." 
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589 (lack of clear Utah case law defeats "obviousness" showing 
for plain error). 
D. There Was No Plain Error in the Instructions 
Defining "Unregistered Broker or Agent•" 
Tenney's next unpreserved complaint is that jury 
instruction 40, defining the crime of being an unregistered 
securities broker, fails to adequately define "agent" or "broker-
dealer." Tenney again fails to apply the correct prejudice 
standard for this contention of "plain error." Br. of Appellant 
at 51 ("This Court cannot be sure that the jury convicted Tenney 
based on a correct definition of these terms"). Therefore, this 
"plain error" point fails. 
No Error, Nor Obviousness 
Tenney's claim of obvious error on this point would 
fail for the reasons outlined earlier (Point IV-A), addressing 
his challenge to the instructions on "employing unregistered 
agents." That is, Tenney identifies no evidence to support a 
possible finding that he fell within the statutory exclusions to 
the definitions of "agent" or "broker-dealer," under Utah Code 
Ann. § 61-1-13(2) and -(3) (1993). Therefore, there was no basis 
to instruct the jury on those exceptions. Without supporting 
evidence, it would have more likely been error to give such 
instructions. Therefore, the "obviousness" element of plain 
error also could not be satisfied on this point. 
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E. Tenney's Redundant "Alternative Element Unanimity" 
Argument Does Not Prove Plain Error on Appeal. 
Tenney's final "plain error" challenge to the jury 
instructions repeats his argument that the jury should have been 
told to unanimously state which of several possible theories it 
applied to find him guilty of securities fraud. Once more, 
Tenney fails to prove the necessary prejudice in his desultory 
statement that there is "no assurance" that the belatedly-alleged 
errors did not affect the verdicts (Br. of Appellant at 52, 53). 
Once more, this defeats the plain error claim. 
No Error, Nor Obviousness 
Tenney's final "elements unanimity" argument (Br. of 
Appellant at 52) does not only repeat his prior focus on the 
elements of security fraud (discussed in Point IV-C-1 of this 
brief); he apparently also attacks instructions related to the 
other criminal counts. However, he does not specify which other 
instructions are "obviously erroneous" for lack of unanimity 
requirements. See Utah R. App. P. 24(a)(9) (appellate argument 
must contain "citations to the authorities, statutes, and parts 
of the record relied on" (emphasis added)). The State cannot 
respond to this "invisible plain error" assertion; nor should 
this Court address it. 
Be that as it may, Tenney's argument on this point 
repeats his questionable premise (as explained in Point IV-C-1), 
that jury unanimity is required among alternative crime elements, 
and that failure to so instruct a jury amounts to obvious error. 
"Saying the same thing twice gives it no more weight." Hammer v. 
45 
Gross, 932 F.2d 842, 852 (9th Cir. 1991) (en banc) (Kozinski, J., 
concurring). Therefore, this Court should reject this final, 
unpreserved instructional challenge.23 
POINT FIVE 
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY DENIED TENNEY'S 
"JUROR MISCONDUCT"-BASED NEW TRIAL MOTION 
In his penultimate point on appeal, Tenney argues that 
the trial court should have granted his post-verdict motion for a 
new trial. Tenney moved for mistrial upon learning that one of 
the jurors, Dr. Barnett, had briefly discussed the case with Dr. 
Christensen, who was acquainted with Tenney, during a recess 
following trial day five. See affidavits of Barnett, 
Christensen, and Margaret Wallace (R. 791-94, 804-06, copied in 
Br. of Appellant addendum D). 
In that conversation, juror Barnett remarked that 
Tenney appeared to be "really a bad guy," or "a slick operator" 
(R. 792, 805) . Christensen responded that "my experiences with 
John Tenney had all been good" (R. 792). Juror Barnett then 
acknowledged that "I shouldn't talk about it at all" (Christensen 
affid. at R. 792), or that "I would have to wait until after 
hearing all the evidence before I decided" (Barnett affid. at R. 
805). By stipulation, Tenney's new trial motion was decided on 
the affidavits and memoranda (R. 807-11, copied in appendix IV of 
this brief). 
23Tenney's argument on this point also repeats his previous 
argument that common law "agency" doctrine belonged in the jury 
instructions, addressed in Point IV-B of this brief. 
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A. The Standard of Review. 
As Tenney indicates (Br. of Appellant at 61, point 
heading), the trial court's denial of his new trial motion should 
be deferentially reviewed for "abuse of discretion." See State 
v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932, 938 (Utah 1994); State v. Wetzel, 868 P.2d 
64, 70 (Utah 1993) . Deference is appropriate because the trial 
court's ruling required application of "juror misconduct" 
principles to unique circumstances, including the likely impact 
of the alleged misconduct on the verdicts. See Pena, 869 P.2d at 
939. Compare Crookston v. Fire Ins. Exchange, 860 P.2d 937, 938 
(Utah 1993) (new trial ruling is reviewed nondeferentially if it 
turns on a narrow legal premise). 
B« No Presumption of Prejudice. 
The condition for deferential review, of course, is 
that the trial court apply the correct legal analysis. In this 
case, the court applied a two-part test for prejudicial juror 
misconduct, from Arellano v. Western Pac. R. Co., 5 Utah 2d 146, 
298 P.2d 527, 529-30 (1956): First, did juror Barnett violate 
the Utah R. Crim. P. 17 (j) admonition "not . . . to converse with 
. . . any other person on any subject of the trial, and that it 
is [the jurors'] duty not to form or express an opinion thereon 
until the case is finally submitted to them"? Second, if Barnett 
disobeyed that admonition, was there prejudice; i.e., did the 
misconduct affect the verdict?24 
24The Arellano analysis was offered by the State, opposing 
Tenney's new trial motion on this point, and was accepted by the 
trial court, as indicated in its minute entry denying the new trial 
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That analysis is appropriate in light of the fact that 
the problem in this case did not involve an "improper contact[] 
between jurors and witnesses, attorneys, or court personnel," 
State v. Pike, 712 P.2d 277, 279 (Utah 1985), which would give 
rise to a rebuttable presumption of prejudice, id. at 280. 
Accord State v. Erickson, 749 P.2d 620 (Utah 1987); State v. 
Swain, 835 P.2d 1009 (Utah App. 1992); Logan City v. Carlsen, 799 
P.2d 224 (Utah App. 1990). Juror Barnett's conversation was with 
a person unrelated to the case under trial. 
Admittedly, a presumption of prejudice has been said to 
exist in cases involving juror conversations with persons who 
were not witnesses, attorneys, or court personnel. See, e.g., 
Remmer v. United States, 347 U.S. 227 (1954) (rebuttable 
presumption of prejudice arose from juror's approach by stranger 
who remarked that juror could profit from a verdict of acquittal; 
remand hearing ordered to determine actual prejudice); State v. 
Thome, 39 Utah 208, 117 P. 58, 66-67 (1911) (conviction reversed 
because of phone call made by juror, in violation of admonition 
and without permission, and of unknown nature). But more 
recently, in Smith v. Phillips, 455 U.S. 209 (1982), the United 
States Supreme Court has disavowed presumed prejudice, or 
"implied bias," from questionable outside-of-trial juror 
conversations. Instead, the Court held that the right to an 
impartial jury is adequately protected when the litigant has 
motion (R. 801, 809). 
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opportunity to explore allegations of juror misconduct, and to 
demonstrate prejudice caused thereby. Id. at 215-18. 
In this case, involving a brief conversation with a 
person having no part in the trial, and with the content of the 
conversation revealed, the Pike presumption of prejudice ought 
not apply. Tenney had the opportunity, in accord with Smith v. 
Phillips, for an evidentiary hearing to explore whether the 
alleged misconduct was prejudicial. He opted instead to submit 
the issue for decision on the affidavits of Barnett, Christensen, 
and Wallace (R. 807). Under these circumstances, the trial court 
was not required to apply a presumption of prejudice. Instead, 
the court properly applied the Arellano analysis, so that 
deferential appellate review is appropriate. 
C. No Abuse of Discretion Occurred. 
1. Juror "May Have" Violated Admonition. 
The trial court equivocally found that juror Barnett 
"may have violated rule 17 (j), Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, 
by briefly conversing with another doctor about defendant's 
business practices" (R. 810-11, copied in appendix IV of this 
brief). Because rule 17 (j) does not allow jurors to discuss 
their pending case at all, the trial court properly found that 
Barnett violated that part of the admonition. 
However, the trial court also found that "Dr. Barnett's 
actions did not indicate that he had formed an opinion or bias 
against defendant" (R. 811). That finding, supported by the 
submitted affidavits, indicates that Barnett had not violated the 
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admonition "not to form or express an opinion" until the case was 
submitted. That finding is not clearly erroneous. 
Additionally, the trial court's "possible violation" 
ruling reflects a legitimate judgment that juror Barnett's 
violation was not extreme. The involved persons agreed that the 
Barnett-Christensen conversation was brief, and included 
Barnett's acknowledgment of his duty not to discuss the case 
(Christensen affid. at R. 792; Barnett affid. at R. 805). Juror 
Barnett's comments did not show "a state of mind . . . with 
reference to the cause, or to either party, which will prevent 
him from acting impartially and without prejudice to the 
substantial rights" of Tenney, the standard for juror bias under 
Utah R. Crim. P. 18(e) (14) : after all, he acknowledged that he 
"would have to wait until after hearing all of the evidence 
before I decided" Tenney's case (Barnett affid. at R. 805). 
2. No Resulting Prejudice. 
Given the brief nature of the Barnett-Christensen 
conversation, the trial court did not abuse its discretion by 
finding no "indication that the actions [of Barnett] would impact 
on the juror's deliberation in the case" (R. 811). Indeed, it is 
self-evident that any prejudice wrought by that conversation 
worked against the State, rather than Tenney, because Christensen 
volunteered his view that Tenney was of good character, telling 
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juror Barnett, "[M]y experiences with John Tenney had all been 
good" (Christensen affid. at R. 792).25 
Tenney therefore struggles, by longshot speculation, to 
demonstrate prejudice. See Br. of Appellant at 66 ("Juror 
Barnett may well have disliked his office mate or had some 
ongoing dispute which left him with no respect for the other 
dentist. Knowledge that the other dentist knew and admired 
Tenney may well have impacted negatively on Juror Barnett"). 
This is an especially dubious speculation given that Barnett and 
Christensen shared office space for their dental practices 
(Wallace affid., R. 793). And having waived an evidentiary 
hearing to more thoroughly explore the prejudice question (R. 
807), Tenney cannot now demonstrate that the trial court abused 
its discretion in finding that no prejudice arose from juror 
Barnett's improper conversation. 
D. "Incidental and Brief Contact." 
Finally, this Court can affirm the trial court's 
judgment on this point under the familiar principle that valid 
alternative grounds also support it. See, e.g., State v. 
Gallegos, 712 P.2d 207, 208-09 (Utah 1985); State v. Elder, 815 
P.2d 1341, 1344 n.4 (Utah App. 1991). The trial court's denial 
of Tenney's juror misconduct-based new trial motion can be 
25In Logan City v. Carlsen, 799 P.2d at 226, this Court stated 
that reversal would be required if the improper juror-bailiff 
conversation "benefitted either the defendant or the City[.]" The 
notion that defendant-benefitting prejudice warrants a new trial, 
however, is not supported by any citation to authority, and lacks 
any apparent logical basis. 
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alternatively affirmed on the ground that the conversation 
between juror Barnett and Dr. Christensen was merely a brief, 
"incidental contact" that could not have had any impact upon 
Barnett's deliberations. See Pike, 712 P.2d at 279-80; Carlsen, 
799 P.2d at 226. 
The submitted affidavits readily support such a 
conclusion. Again, Dr. Christensen's affidavit--submitted by 
Tenney--reflects that the conversation consisted of but five or 
six sentences, ending with juror Barnett's statement that he 
could not discuss the case (R. 791-92). The affidavit of 
Margarent Wallace (R. 793-94), who overheard the conversation, 
similarly recounts a very brief exchange. These affidavits 
corroborate juror Barnett's own account of a brief conversation, 
centered on the coincidence that Dr. Christensen happened to know 
defendant Tenney (R. 804-05). In sum, on the grounds identified 
by the trial court, or on this alternative ground, the trial 
court's denial of Tenney's "juror misconduct"-based new trial 
motion should be affirmed. 
POINT SIX 
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY ORDERED TENNEY TO 
PAY $39,000 RESTITUTION TO CELLWEST INVESTOR 
ZIEGLOWSKY 
Tenney's final appellate contention is that the trial 
court erroneously ordered him to pay $39,000 restitution to 
defrauded Cellwest investor James Zieglowsky. At a post-verdict 
restitution hearing (R. 2365-84, copied in appendix V) Tenney, 
then represented by professional counsel, stipulated to $53,950 
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restitution owed to nine other investors (R. 2366) . Tenney also 
agreed to try the restitution issue by proffer with respect to 
Zieglowsky (R. 2365). 
The Zieglowsky dispute exists because Zieglowsky 
purchased his Cellwest stock via real property and mortgage 
transactions, rather than by cash. Under those contracts, Tenney 
was to assume rent collection and mortgage payment responsibility 
for the real property. He defaulted those obligations, forcing 
Zieglowsky to pay arrearages on one parcel, and to suffer 
foreclosure on another (R. 2367-2374). Although Tenney contested 
the nature of his obligations toward the subject property, the 
State introduced supporting documentation in the form of 
quitclaim deeds, mortgage agreements, and the like (R. 2386) . 
By proffer, Tenney acknowledged that he owed Zieglowsky 
$20,000 (R. 2375). The trial court expressed an inclination to 
order double restitution, as permitted by statute (R. 2384) . In 
the end, upon review of the parties' memoranda, the trial court 
accepted the State's proffer and documentary evidence, finding 
Zieglowsky's loss to be $39,000, and ordered restitution in that 
amount (R. 2501-04 Order, copied in Br. of Appellant addendum 
E) .26 Due to his trial court acknowledgment, Tenney really only 
disputes $19,000 of the restitution order to Zieglowsky. 
26The parties' restitution memoranda were not included in the 
record on appeal. 
53 
A. The Standard of Review. 
Tenney properly identifies the standard of review (Br. 
of Appellant at 4-5): restitution orders are reviewed 
deferentially for "abuse of discretion." State v. Snyder, 747 
P.2d 417, 422 (Utah 1987); State v. Robinson, 860 P.2d 979, 980-
81 (Utah App. 1993); State v. Twitchell, 832 P.2d 866, 868 (Utah 
App. 1992). Disregarding this standard in his argument, Tenney 
attempts to convert this issue to one of constitutional due 
process. He contends, "As can be seen from the proffers, 
Appellant did not have an opportunity to be fully heard and the 
trial judge did not receive sufficient evidence to accurately 
calculate the damages in this case" (Br. of Appellant at 68-69) . 
That contention is meritless. As already recited, 
Tenney expressly (and with assistance of counsel) agreed to try 
the restitution issue by proffer (R. 2365) . In other words, 
Tenney voluntarily relinquished his right to be "fully heard" and 
to offer "sufficient evidence" about the amount of restitution. 
To now entertain Tenney's "due process" argument would encourage 
invited error, contrary to sound, settled principle. See Dunn, 
850 P.2d at 1220; Tillman I, 750 P.2d at 553 n.20, 560-61 & nn. 
40-41. This Court should reject Tenney's due process challenge 
to the restitution order. 
This Court should also reject Tenney's argument that 
"the amount of damages which James Zieglowsky sustained involves 
a complex question which would be better left to.civil 
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litigation" (Br. of Appellant at 69). The Utah legislature has 
decided that restitution can be ordered in criminal cases: 
When a person is convicted of criminal 
activity that has resulted in pecuniary damages, 
in addition to any other sentence it may impose, 
the court shall order that the defendant make 
restitution up to double the amount of pecuniary 
damages to the victim or victims of the offense of 
which the defendant has been convicted, or to the 
victim of any other criminal conduct admitted by 
the defendant to the sentencing court. 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-201(4) (a) (i) (1995) (emphasis added) . 
Tenney does not argue that this statute is unconstitutional 
beyond reasonable doubt, State v. Bell, 785 P.2d 390, 398 (Utah 
1989). That, however, is the showing he would have to make in 
order to prove that the trial court was required to relegate 
Zieglowsky's restitution to civil litigation. Because the court 
acted as the valid, governing criminal statute requires, the 
standard for reviewing the Zieglowsky restitution order remains 
highly deferential. 
B. No Abuse of Discretion in Restitution Order. 
The trial court did not abuse its section 76-3-201 
discretion in the restitution order. As already recited, most of 
the disputed $19,000 was related to one parcel of property. 
While Tenney disputed the nature of the agreement between him and 
Zieglowsky with respect to that parcel (R. 2379-80), the State 
produced documentary evidence tending to show that the agreement 
existed, and was breached by Tenney, therefore causing the 
financial loss (R. 2386) • 
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Additionally, analogous to its prerogative to decide 
which opposing testimony to believe, e.g., State v. Walker, 743 
P.2d 191, 192-93 (Utah 1987), the trial court surely had 
discretion to choose between the State's and Tenney's proffers 
about the total amount of Zieglowsky's loss. That being the 
case, Tenney must show "clear error" in the trial court's 
acceptance of the State's $39,000 proffer, as opposed to the 
$20,000 proffered by Tenney. This is especially true given that 
the State presented documentary evidence on the $19,000 disputed 
balance. But Tenney attempts no such showing. That being the 
case, this Court should hold that the trial court did not abuse 
its discretion in ordering Tenney to pay $39,000 restitution for 
the loss suffered by Mr. Zieglowsky. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, Tenney's convictions, 
sentences, and restitution order should be AFFIRMED. Given the 
length of the parties' briefs and the novelty of the subject 
matter, the State is inclined to agree with Tenney's request for 
oral argument. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this *2Q day of September, 
1995. 
JAN GRAHAM 
Utah Attorney General 
J. KEVIN MURPHY U 
Assistant Attorney General 
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Recommended Colloquy for 
Self-Representation Requests 
Discussion re: Manner of Testimony 
(R. 1723-28) 
RECOMMENDED COLLOQUY WITH PROSPECTIVE PRO SE DEFENDANTS 
from 
State v. Frampton, 737 P.2d 183, 187-88 n.12 (Utah 1987), 
quoting Bench Book for United States District Court Judges, 
vol. 1 §§ 1.02-2 to -5 (Federal Judicial Center, 3d ed. 
1986) : 
An accused has a constitutional right to represent 
himself if he chooses to do so. A defendant's waiver of 
counsel must, however, be knowing and voluntary. This means 
that you must make clear on the record that the defendant is 
fully aware of the hazards that he faces and the 
disadvantages of self-representation. 
When a defendant states that he wishes to represent 
himself, you should therefore ask questions similar to the 
following: 
(a) Have you ever studied law? 
(b) Have you ever represented yourself or any other 
defendant in a criminal action? 
(c) You realize, do you not, that you are charged with 
these crimes: (Here state the crimes with which the 
defendant is charged.) 
(d) You realize, do you not, that if you are found 
guilty of the crime charged in Count I, the court . . . 
could sentence you to as much as years in prison and 
fine you as much as $ ? (Then ask him a similar question 
with respect to each other crime with which he may be 
charged in the indictment or information.) 
(e) You realize, do you not, that if you are found 
guilty of more than one of those crimes this court can order 
that the sentences be served consecutively, that is, one 
after another? 
(f) You realize, do you not, that if you represent 
yourself, you are on your own? I cannot tell you how you 
should try your case or even advise you as to how to try 
your case. 
(g) Are you familiar with the . . . Rules of Evidence? 
(h) You realize, do you not, that the . . . Rules of 
Evidence govern what evidence may or may not be introduced 
at trial and, in representing yourself, you must abide by 
those rules? 
(i) Are you familiar with the . . . Rules of Criminal 
Procedure? 
(j) You realize, do you not, that those rules govern 
the way in which a criminal action is tried in . . . court? 
(k) You realize, do you not, that if you decide to take 
the witness stand, you must present your questions by asking 
questions of yourself? You cannot just take the stand and 
tell your story. You must proceed question by question 
through your testimony. 
(1) (Then say to the defendant something to this 
effect): I must advise you that in my opinion you would be 
far better defended by a trained lawyer than you can be by 
yourself. I think it is unwise of you to try to represent 
yourself. You are not familiar with the law. You are not 
familiar with court procedure. You are not familiar with 
the Rules of Evidence. I would strongly urge you not to try 
to represent yourself. 
(m) Now, in light of the penalty that you might suffer 
if you are found guilty and in light of all the difficulties 
of representing yourself, is it still your desire to 
represent yourself and to give up your right to be 
represented by a lawyer? 
(n) Is your decision entirely voluntary on your part? 
(o) If the answers to the two preceding questions are 
in the affirmative, you should then say something to the 
following effect: "I find that the defendant has knowingly 
and voluntarily waived his right to counsel. I will 
therefore permit him to represent himself." 
(p) You should consider the appointment of standby 
counsel to assist the defendant and to replace him if the 
court should determine during trial that the defendant can 
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 f t u c i t 
2 you are going to testify in this particular case, of 
3 course, as you are aware, the law gives you the 
4 constitutional right not to testify in this particular 
5 case. I think I ought to give you some advance notice 
6 regarding how we are going to handle that 
7 procedurally. 
8 Do you understand the issue that I am 
9 raising? 
10 MR. TENNEY: I do. I am glad you 
11 brought it up. I was going to bring up the same 
12 issue. 
13 THE COURT: Tell me what you want to 
14 bring up about that issue? 
15 MR. TENNEY: As I understand, there are 
16 a couple of possibilities as to just how we might do 
17 this: One is to have someone read questions that I 
18 formulated, and I give answers. And I thought about 
19 having Patrick Anderson do that. 
20 However, another procedure would be to 
21 simply use a narrative approach. I would prefer the 
22 narrative approach simply because I want to impress 
23 the Jury with the fact that I am pro se. I've 
24 conducted my case pro se from the very beginning. And 
25 the Court has, at this point, not allowed Patrick 
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1 Anderson, really, to express himself orally. So that 
2 would be my preference. But I'm certainly at the 
3 discretion of the Court as to how this should be 
4 done. But that would be the way I would prefer to do 
5 it. 
6 THE COURT: Thank you. 
7 Ms. Barlow. 
8 MS. BARLOW: Your Honor, the State would 
9 prefer the other fashion. Itfs very difficult in a 
10 narrative fashion to cull out the things that are 
11 inadmissible and to allow us to object every two 
12 seconds when he gets into something that might be 
13 considered closing argument, as it were. 
14 I think if questions can be formulated 
15 and it can be conducted in a professional fashion, 
16 which is, I think, the way that it is usually 
17 conducted, when you have both sides asking questions, 
18 I think that that would be preferable. 
19 In a narrative fashion, you get into all 
20 sorts of things that may or may not be relevant to 
21 what we are doing here. And, frankly, it might put us 
22 in a bad light to be objecting every so often when he 
23 says things. 
24 THE COURT: You then have no objection 
25 with Mr* Tenney's first alternative, with having him 
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1 draft his own questions and having Mr. Anderson simply 
2 read the questions drafted by Mr. Tenney? 
3 MS. BARLOW: We may object to the form 
4 of a question. 
5 THE COURT: But the proper -- we are 
6 talking about procedure. 
7 MS. BARLOW: The procedure, we have no 
8 problem with. 
9 THE COURT: Okay. Let's do it this 
10 way. 
11 MR. TENNEY: If we did that, would 
12 Patrick Anderson -- Mr. Anderson have any leeway to 
13 expand on the questions? In other words, do I need to 
14 give a copy of questions to the State, or would he be 
15 able to ask the questions the way that he sees fit? 
16 THE COURT: No. This is what I am going 
17 to require --
18 MR. TENNEY: Okay. 
19 THE COURT: •- assuming Mr. Tenney were 
20 to testify -- and we don't know that as of yet -- but 
21 assuming he were to testify, what I'm going to 
22 require, Mr. Tenney, is that you, in fact, draft the 
23 questions. I am not going to require at this point 
24 that you disclose those questions to the State. But I 
25 am going to require you to have those questions 
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1 drafted in written form* 
2 I am going to allow Mr* Anderson to put 
3 those questions to you, but he will be required to put 
4 those questions to you exactly as you have prepared 
5 them in written form. 
6 Additionally, what I am going to 
7 require, Mr. Tenney, is that, prior to your testimony, 
8 if you testify, I am going to require that you submit 
9 to this Court a copy of those instructions that 
10 Mr. Anderson will be reading to you. 
11 And the sole purpose of that is: At 
12 this point, I am not going to disclose those questions 
13 to the State, but I must have some way of showing that 
14 Mr. Anderson is simply reading the questions that you 
15 have -- reading the questions verbatim that you have 
16 prepared in written form. 
17 And the reason why I am going to do it 
18 that way versus just a outright narrative is that I 
19 think it's more -- more appropriate for the State to 
20 have the opportunity to interpose timely objections to 
21 the questions, and it's extremely difficult to do that 
22 in a narrative form in a proper manner. So we will 
23 proceed in that manner. 
24 Mr. Anderson, did you have a question? 
25 MR. ANDERSON: Well, your Honor, if I 
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1 may: Who will be handling the objections when the 
2 State interposes those? Mr. Tenney or myself. 
3 THE COURT: Mr. Tenney will be required 
4 to handle the objections. I don't see where that 
5 procedure will be any problem at all. 
6 MR. ANDERSON: And Mr. Tenney has 
7 expressed the concern to me many times that he wants 
8 to preserve -- as he expressed to you -- his pro se 
9 status. I just request that — the Court has informed 
10 the Jury of that. I'm just basically the mouthpiece 
11 for the questions. 
12 THE COURT: I will inform the Jury of 
13 the procedure, that you are not posing these questions 
14 on your own, that these are the questions drafted by 
15 Mr. Tenney. 
16 And to avoid a situation where 
17 Mr. Tenney asks himself the question and repeats his 
18 own answers, this seems to be a more efficient, 
19 realistic manner of handling it by allowing 
20 Mr. Anderson simply to read the question. 
21 So I will give the Jury those 
22 instructions. 
23 Okay, we will recess at this time. 
24 MS. BARLOW: Your Honor, if I may just 
25 put something on the record? 
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APPENDIX II 
"Prosecutor Misconduct"-based Mistrial Motion 
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(R. 579-80, 1671-81) 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
V. 
JOHN B. TENNEY, 
Defendant. 
MOTION FOR A MISTRIAL 
Case No. 921901056FS 
JUDGE TYRONE E. MEDLEY 
The prosecutor statfed in her opening statement that, this 
case is about people being taken by a smooth talking salesman who 
"defrauded" three hundred ana thirty-three people out of their 
money. This statement as well as the theme of the prosecutor's 
opening statement is not supported by any evidence in the record. 
Since the prosecution has rested and since the burden is on the 
state to come forth with all evidence necessary to support their 
allegations, Mr. Tenney herein moves for a mistrial based on the 
prejudicial and unsupported statements made during the prosecutor's 
opening statement. 
Court's follow the general rule that, Mthe assertion of 
facts in an opening statement which are not proved during trial may 
constitute grounds for a mistrial if there is a reasonable 
possibility that the admissible evidence contributed to the 
conviction." State v. West, 617 P.2d 1298, 1300 (Mont. 1980). See 
00579 
also State v. Troy, 688 P.2d 483 (Utah 1984) (counsel is obligated 
to avoid reference to those matters the jury is not justified in 
considering, and where there was no compelling proof of defendant's 
guilt, court concluded reversal was required because jurors probably 
were influenced by the improper remarks). 
The Court has already ruled that the prejudicial affect of 
the shareholder list outweighed the probative value of its 
admission. In suppressing the introduction of the shareholder list, 
the Court expressed its concern over the impact such a list would 
have upon the jury. This concern is magnified when applied to the 
opening statement declaration that Mr. Tenney had "defrauded" three 
hundred and thirty-three people. This evidence has not been 
solicited through the state's factual witnesses and the mere numbers 
is highly inflammatory and prejudicial to Mr. Tenney. 
Approximately, the first sentence out of the prosecutor's 
mouth referred to Mr. Tenney "defrauding" three hundred and 
thirty-three people. The primacy of this statement and the 
inability of the state to bring forward any evidence of any 
shareholder being defrauded, beyond the thirteen listed in the 
information, establishes a reasonable possibility that the 
inadmissible evidence would contribute to a conviction. State v. 
West, 617 P.d at 1300. Therefore, this court should grant Mr. 
Tenney's motion for a mistrial. 




1 (Jury leaves.) 
2 THE COURT: The record may reflect that 
3 the Jury has been excused from the the courtroom. The 
4 parties are present, however. 
5 Mr. Tenney, you have a motion which 
6 you'd like to make? 
7 MR. TENNEY: Yes, I do, your Honor. The 
8 motion I'd like to make, I've just handed to you in 
9 written form. I'd like to just orally make this 
10 motion and argue it very briefly. 
11 This is a motion for a mistrial. And 
12 the basis for this motion is that the Prosecutor, Lynn 
13 Nicholas, stated in her opening statement that this 
14 case is a case about people being taken by a 
15 smooth-talking salesman who, quote, defrauded 333 
16 people out of their money. 
17 This statement, as well as the theme of 
18 the Prosecutor's opening statement, is not supported 
19 by evidence in the record. And since the Prosecution 
20 has rested and since the burden is on the State to 
21 come forward with all the evidence that's necessary to 
22 support their allegations, I move for a mistrial based 
23 on the very serious prejudicial and unsupported 
24 statement made during the opening statement by the 
25 State. 
165 BOWERS WIT ST ReD 
01671 
1 The Court, of course, follows the 
2 general rule that, quote, the assertion of facts in an 
3 opening statement which are not proved during trial 
4 may constitute grounds for a mistrial if there is a 
5 reasonable possibility that the admissible evidence 
6 contributed to the conviction, end of quote. That's 
7 quoting from State v. West 617 — quoted in 617 P.2d 
8 at 1298. It's a Montana 1980 case. 
9 THE COURT: Do you have a copy of that 
10 case? 
11 MR. TENNEY: I don't have it. I am 
12 sorry, yes, I do. 
13 THE CODRT: Go ahead. Are you through, 
14 Mr. Tenney? 
15 MR. TENNEY: Not quite. The — counsel 
16 is obligated to avoid any reference to any matters 
17 that the jury is not justified in considering. And as 
18 I've argued forcefully earlier today, this is, I 
19 think, a very serious prejudicial error. And where 
20 there is no compelling proof of my guilt, the court in 
21 this case concluded that reversal was required because 
22 the jurors probably were influenced by the improper 
23 remarks. 
24 I think it is unquestionable that the 
25 Jurors believe that there are 333 stockholders in the 
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1 company based upon the statements made by the 
2 statements made by the State in the opening 
3 statement* 
4 The Court has already ruled that the 
5 prejudicial effect of this Stockholder List or 
6 Shareholder List has outweighed probative value. So, 
7 in suppressing the introduction of the Shareholders 
8 List, the Court also expressed its concern over the 
9 impact that this list would have on the Jury. And 
10 it's magnified when we apply it to the opening 
11 statement that Mr. Tenney, quote, defrauded 333 
12 people. The evidence has not been solicited through 
13 the State's factual witnesses, and the mere numbers 
14 are highly inflammatory and prejudicial to me, 
15 Mr. Tenney. 
16 Nearly the very first heard sentence out 
17 of the Prosecutor's mouth referred to me as, quote, 
18 defrauding 333 people. This statement and the fact of 
19 the inability of the State to bring forward any 
20 evidence of any such claim of any shareholder being 
21 defrauded, other than those they've brought into the 
22 court here as witnesses, establishes, clearly, a 
23 reasonable possibility that the inadmissible evidence 
24 would, in fact, contribute to a conviction. 
25 As I stated earlier, I'm greatly 
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1 concerned about the effect it would have on the minds 
2 and hearts of the Jurors. And, again, we are quoting 
3 here from State v. West, at 617 P.2d at 1300. 
4 For this reason, the Court should grant 
5 my motion for a mistrial at this time. Thank you* 
6 THE COURT: Thank you, Mr. Tenney. 
7 Miss Barlow? 
8 MS. BARLOW: Your Honor, I would like to 
9 first correct -- the statement that Ms. Nicholas made 
10 was that John Tenney deliberately defrauded dozens of 
11 innocent -- excuse me, decent people, 333 people, 
12 mostly citizens of Utah, were taken by that man for a 
13 lot of money. So maybe to get correctly what was 
14 said. She never did say he defrauded 333 people. 
15 But that's — the significant point is 
16 that — and I believe it's State v. Troy. I can't 
17 remember if that's the actual case name. But there is 
18 a case -- I believe it's State v. Troy — that says 
19 there are certain matters -- well, when the Court is 
20 looking at prosecutorial misconduct, which is what the 
21 claim is here, the Court has a two-prong test: One, 
22 did the person -- did the prosecutor say something 
23 that the jury was not supposed to be privy to, and 
24 then, number two, did it prejudice the case? 
25 Granted, we mentioned 333 people because i 
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1 we thought at that time we'd get the Shareholder List 
2 in. I am not at all sure that we still won't get it 
3 in by the end of this trial. I don't know. 
4 But more significantly, this Court 
5 directed — as I recall, directed the Jury that they 
6 were not to take anything that was said in opening 
7 statements as evidence. And if we have not proven up 
8 this 333 people statement, then Mr* Tenney can argue 
9 that in closing argument. 
10 But I submit this Jury is a very 
11 attentive jury. And I don't think they are a jury 
12 that sat there listening Ms. Nicholas in opening 
13 statement and thought, "Oh, there must be 333 people" 
14 if we don't present that evidence. There is no basis 
15 for believing that this jury has already convicted 
16 Mr. Tenney of defrauding 333 people. 
17 And since there is no basis for 
18 believing that, although the statement, perhaps — 
19 well, in hindsight, now, since we have not yet got 
20 that Stockholders List in, in hindsight, perhaps might 
21 not -- perhaps should not have been said, and perhaps 
22 is something that the Jury should not have been privy 
23 to, but there is no prejudice. It was opening 
24 statement* 
25 I submit that, while this Montana Case 
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.*. A© iiiucicsLiii^ f At At> nuntana r a m e r m a n utan. I 
2 notice, on Page 1,300, that they seem to follow this 
3 prejudice prong just as Utah follows it* But more 
4 importantly, the Utah case law is that you have to 
5 establish, number one, something was said that perhaps 
6 shouldn't have been said; number two, that there's 
7 prejudice*4 And I submit there has just not been a 
8 showing of prejudice at this point* 
9 The Jury has not been shown to have 
10 already decided this case* 
11 THE COURT: Thank you, Ms. Barlow. 
12 It is your motion, Mr. Tenney. I will 
13 give you a brief opportunity to respond, if you wish 
14 to, sir* 
15 MR. TENNEY: Thank you, your Honor. I 
16 am not arguing prosecutorial misconduct. I am arguing 
17 prejudice. In the opening statements, the statement 
18 was made that the people were taken for a lot of 
19 money. And the standard that I've cited, simply says 
20 that — 
21 THE COURT: Well, can I ask you a 
22 question, Mr* Tenney? 
23 THE TENNEY: Sure. 
24 THE COURT: You threw me a curve here, 
25 and I want to make sure I understood what you said* 
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1 MR. TENNEY: Okay. 
2 THE COURT: Now, is it the statement 
3 that 300 and some people were defrauded, or is it the 
4 statement that some -- that people were taken for a 
5 lot of money that you are objecting to, or is it 
6 both? 
7 MR. TENNEY: It is both. But it is 
8 specifically the statement of 333 stockholders, which 
9 is -- that is considered in the light of the statement 
10 that goes with it that they were taken for a lot of 
11 money. My objection is to both statements, but 
12 specifically as to the 333 stockholders. 
13 And the standard is simply if there is a 
14 reasonable possibility. And Ms. Barlow is right, this 
15 is, in fact, a very attentive jury. I don't see how 
16 all of the members of the jury could have missed that 
17 statement. There's no possible way that they could 
18 have missed it. And I do believe it has inflamed 
19 their minds and their feelings in regard to this 
20 case. There's certainly that reasonable possibility. 
21 That's why I'm arguing prejudice. 
22 MS. BARLOW: Your Honor, may I respond 
23 to the dollar figure? Since he didn't mention that 
24 the first time, I didn't respond to it. 
25 THE COURT: Go ahead. 
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x no. BHKUUW z J. tninK nis own Exhibits, 
2 12 and 13 — and in those exhibits dealing with 
3 Cellwest and Cellwest Communications, he -- in Item 
4 in each one of these exhibits — well, in the first 
5 exhibit for Cellwest -- I'm sorry. I don't have the 
6 number. It is either 12 or 13 -- he indicates that 
7 the number*of shares outstanding are seven point six 
8 million shares. In the other exhibit, for Cellwest 
9 Communcations, the number outstanding is eight point 
10 five million shares. At a dollar a share, which is 
11 what most people bought, we are talking 15 million 
12 dollars. So I don't think that the figure she threw 
13 out there is something that the Jury has not had som 
14 evidence might be there. That's all I have. 
15 MR. TENNEY: Your Honor, may I just — 
16 the number of shares, your Honor, has nothing to do 
17 with the dollar value. One or two or three people 
18 could own that number of shares. That has virtually 
19 no relationship to the value of the money raised at 
20 all. 
21 THE COURT: We'll recess just long 
22 enough to give me the opportunity to the read the 
23 case, and then I'm going to rule on the motion. 
24 (Recess) 
25 THE COURT: The record may reflect tha 
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1 all parties are present* The Jury is not present at 
2 this time. 
3 Mr* Tenney, Miss Barlow, Ms. Nicholas, I 
4 have had an opportunity to the read the cases 
5 submitted to me in support of Mr. Tenney's motion for 
6 a mistrial. 
7 That motion is going to be denied at 
8 this time for the following reasons: First of all --
9 and the record ought to reflect that the Court is 
10 relying on the case of State v. Troy, cited at 688 
11 P.2d 483, a 1984 Utah case, as the authority in this 
12 State. 
13 On this particular issue, that case sets 
14 forth a two-prong test: The first step or test is 
15 whether or not the remarks made by the prosecutor 
16 clearly called to the attention of the jury matters 
17 outside of the evidence. 
18 When making reference to the Defendant 
19 in this particular case, the Court is of the opinion 
20 that that prong has not been met for the following 
21 reasons: Despite the fact that at this stage, anyway, 
22 the Court did not allow into evidence State's Proposed 
23 Exhibits 88 and 89, which I believe are alleged to be 
24 Stockholders Lists, the statements made by the 
25 Prosecutor in this particular case, in this Court's 
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x u p i u i y i i f was> uiaae on r e a s u n a u x e t e n a n c e t n a c t n e 
2 e v i d e n c e r e g a r d i n g t h o s e l i s t s would come i n t o 
3 evidence. 
4 And hindsight is always 20/20, 
5 obviously. And despite the fact that that evidence 
6 was not received, the Court is not of the opinion that 
7 the Prosecutor was attempting to call to the attention 
8 of the Jury matters that were clearly outside of the 
9 evidence. 
10 In the Troy Case, for example, is a 
11 situation where the Prosecutor intentionally made 
12 reference to the defendant's aliases, asked the jury 
13 to compare the defendant to a Mr. Hinckly, matters so 
14 far outside the evidence in that particular case --
15 the Court is satisfied that that threshold has simply 
16 not been met in this particular case. 
17 This is a case about — at least from 
18 the State's perspective -- and keeping in mind I have 
19 only heard the State's case, at this point, but 
20 certainly the Court is satisfied that at this stage of 
21 the proceedings there is sufficiently compelling 
22 evidence to support the State's allegations in this 
23 particular case, that the likelihood that the 
24 statements made by the Prosecutor, that they were 
25 prejudicial, is highly unlikely. 
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1 The second prong of the Troy analysis 
2 deals with the issue of prejudice. And Troy basically 
3 says that when the evidence is thin and it's more 
4 likely that the jury is going to be swayed by improper 
5 remarks, then the threshold of prejudice is a little 
6 easier met. 
7 On the other hand, where the evidence is 
8 sufficiently compelling -- and this Court is of the 
9 opinion that the evidence is sufficiently compelling. 
10 Thie Court is not convinced that the statements will 
11 have any prejudicial effect, considering the other 
12 compelling evidence that has been received consistent 
13 with the elements of the counts charged in the 
14 information. 
15 Also taking into consideration that the 
16 Court did give an admonition to the Jury instructing 
17 them, the fact that the opening statements made by the 
18 parties were, in fact, not evidence and should not be 
19 construed as evidence by the Jury. 
20 For those reasons, Mr. Tenney, your 
21 motion for a mistrial is denied. 
22 Mr. Tenney, are you ready to call your 
23 first witness? 
24 MR. TENNEY: I have one other motion to 
25 make, your Honor. 
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APPENDIX III 
Ruling Excluding Cellwest Investor List 
(R. 1434-40) 
1 MR. TENNEY: Your Honor, it may or may not be 
2 premature to making motion. I don't know the procedure, 
3 but the State intends to introduce or have Debra Browning 
4 give evidence regarding a stockholders' list from 
5 Cellwest. I have two or three problems with that and I 
6 will make this in the form of a motion if you instruct. 
7 I don't know the procedures, ajs I said. 
8 The problem, No. 1, that I have with this is 
9 that the prejudicial effect of introducing a 
10 stockholders' list of Cellwest far outweighs the 
11 probative values. It is very inflammatory. Simply 
12 because it implies, depending on which list we use, that 
13 all of these people might also have been victims and that 
14 they didn't get their dollars back as some of the 
15 witnesses have testified. There is no evidence in on the 
16 people on this stockholders' list. That is my second 
17 point, is that it is simply not relevant for at least 
18 three reasons. First of all, the information on the 
19 stockholders' list is not related to the charges in this 
20 case. There has been adequate testimony, No. 1, from the 
21 people in connection with this case who I am charged with 
22 having violated securities laws, both fraud and selling 
23 unregistered securities. And No. 3, there is no one 
24 present that can authenticate these documents. I haven't 
25 put on my case yet, but one of my major issues for which 
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I will be calling government witnesses, is to show that 
we have had some problems with our stockholders' list and 
as a result, we have at least three or four versions of 
the list. There is not a certified list. 
Nearly a year ago, Ms. Nicholas asked me to 
stipulate to this and I said no. And she said how she 
could get a copy of a certified list, and I instructed 
her that she needed to contact Mr. Bruce Rogers, Trans-
international stock transfer, our last stock transfer 
agent, to get a certified list from him. And it seems to 
me that we should have at least had a Motion in Limine or 
some kind of a hearing and not be caught at this stage of 
the proceedings with trying to introduce evidence, which 
I have clearly opposed for well over one year. And I 
think it is very, very important that this not be — that 
we look at this because I think it is extremely 
inflammatory. 
THE COURT: So you are making specific 
reference to State's Proposed Exhibit 88; is that 
correct? 
MR. TENNEY: I believe it is No. 88, Your 
Honor. 
MS. BARLOW: Yes, it is. 
MR. TENNEY: It is No. 88. I have in my hand 
here at least seven stockholders' lists, with four 
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different stock transfer agents. None of them certified. 
I don't believe that Debra Browning, she is not a stock 
transfer agent. She was simply a secretary at Cellwest. 
That is the basis of my objection. I would make that if 
you prefer in the form of a motion or however you would 
like me to do it. 
THE COURT: Thank you, Mr. Tenney. 
MS. BARLOW: Your Honor, as far as the issue of 
prejudicial outweighs the probative, Mr. Tenney has 
indicated it implies that these victims, quote, unquote, 
did not get their money back. We are not presenting it 
to show that anyone got their money back. In fact, 
getting their money back has nothing to do with 
securities fraud. Some people did get their money back. 
That doesn't make it not securities fraud. It is the 
misrepresentations and the failure to present relevant 
facts that makes it securities fraud. It has nothing to 
do with whether anybody got their money back or not. We 
are not trying to claim that these investigators did or 
did not get their money back. 
As far as relevant, it shows that there was a 
scheme and we indicate that it is to defraud. We have 
over 300 investors listed on this list and well over 4 
million shares, and I think that goes to whether there 
was a scheme or an artifice occurring here. 
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1 As far as authentication, this list does not 
2 need to be certified. What Ms. Lyman would testify to is 
3* that she had a list, if not this very one, then a similar 
4 list that she kept in her desk, that she would be told to 
5 add names to or delete names from as information came in. 
6 She will testify how this list came into being. 
7 As far as Bruce Rogers and Trans-national, Ms. 
8 Nicholas did check on these people. She can't find 
9 J either that business or that person. But the underlying 
10 issue is whether there has to be some kind of a certified 
11 list from a transfer agent, and I submit that that is not 
12 what we are submitting this for. Ms. Lyman can testify 
13 as a person who was in the office and using a list 
14 similar to this. She can testify that the names are the 
15 same. That the list is similar to the ones she was using 
16 on a daily basis under Mr. Tenney's direction. 
17 MR. TENNEY: Your Honor, may I respond to that? 
18 THE COURT: Just very briefly. 
19 MR. TENNEY: Just very briefly. The problem 
20 is, if the State wants to use this to show that there was 
21 a scheme to defraud, then we have to have some foundation 
22 for admitting any of the lists. The lists that I have, 
23 all but one — two of the lists have stock transfer names 
24 on there that are not signed. We have no authentication 
25 whatsoever as to where they came from. The only 
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1 stockholders' list that is authenticated is one in 
2 connection with one of these companies and it is — it 
3 has a notary public and it was part of a merger 
4 agreement. That is the only stockholders" list that I 
5 have here. I have seven lists. I think we have a major 
6 problem and I believe it is going to hurt me much more 
7 than it will help me, and I do not believe that there is 
8 any foundation for bringing in a stockholders' list that 
9 is not certified. 
10 THE COURT: I am going to rule as follows, Ms. 
11 Barlow and Mr. Tenney. At this point I am going to 
12 sustain Mr. Tenney*s objection and preclude the State 
13 from introducing proposed exhibit No. 88. We will state 
14 that as part of the record. The reason why the Court is 
15 going to preclude the State from introducing that exhibit 
16 and the testimony of Ms. Lyman — 
17 MS. BARLOW: Is that in reference to the 
18 exhibit? 
19 THE COURT: She has other purposes? 
20 MS. BARLOW: Yes. 
21 THE COURT: As it relates to exhibit 88, the 
22 Court is of the opinion that the probative value of this 
23 document is outweighed by its prejudicial effect for the 
24 reason that it does contain what appears to be over 300 




























Cellwest. It includes, looks like it includes data, 
alleged data, purchase of chares. The Court is of the 
opinion that taking into consideration the number that 
appears on that list, also the total amount of dollars, 
looks like in the millions of dollars, that the jury in 
this case, there is a high likelihood that they may use 
this particular list and construe that these individuals 
on this list were also the victims of fraud. 
There is also some danger obviously that when 
we first began this case and explained to the members of 
the jury those individuals who were the subject of the 
various counts of the Information, we identified those 
individuals and if I recall the Jurors' responses, they 
were not familiar with, nor did they have any 
relationship whatsoever with the individuals who are the 
subject of the counts contained in the Information. 
There, of course, the danger that the list is so long 
that there may be a relationship with the jurors and 
those individuals listed on the stockholders' list. And 
this Court is of the opinion that while the evidence may, 
in fact, be relevant, Ms. Barlow, that the prejudicial 
effect of this evidence far outweighs its probative 
value. 
So as to proposed exhibit 88, the Court is 
going to preclude admission of that document, as well as 
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1 Ms. Lyman's testimony regarding State's Exhibit 88. 
2 Ms. Barlow, you indicated that the witness had 
3 some other purposes for which the witness is expected to 
4 testify. 
5 MS. BARLOW: Yes, Your Honor. Ms. Nicholas 
6 J informs me that there is case law that allows in these 
7 kinds of cases entry of a similar document. May we renew 
8 our attempt to introduce this at a later time if we 
9 present to the Court with case law that would support its 
10 admission? 
11 THE COURT: Let's put it this way, I am going 
12 to read any authority you submit to me; but identify for 
13 me the purposes that the witness is going to testify to 
14 other than State's Exhibit 88. 
15 MS. BARLOW: She was a secretary and we are 
16 going to ask her about her familiarity with Rick Jensen, 
17 Steve Bowers, Ron Jeppson, Glen Kimball, names that have 
18 been given here and what association, if any, they had 
19 with Cellwest and also she was familiar with Mr. Tenney's 
20 signature that appears on some of these documents. 
21 MR. TENNEY: I do have a problem with that. I 
22 was already — Where my signature is involved either — 
23 we'll stay out of it. I dust don't know what I am trying 
24 to say. 




"Juror Misconduct"-based New Trial Motion 
Stipulation to Submit Motion on Affidavits 
Ruling Denying Motion 
(R. 807-12) 
PATRICK L. ANDERSON, (#4787) 
Attorney for Defendant 
SALT LAKE LEGAL DEFENDER ASSOCIATION 
424 East 500 South, Suite 300 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: 532-5444 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD 
*- v> ^ n : 
AJCJJ 3^f/!'S3 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
JOHN B. TENNEY, 
Defendant. 
STIPULATION TO SUBMIT FOR 
DECISION 
Case No. 921901056FS 
JUDGE TYRONE E. MEDLEY 
STIPULATION 
On July 26, 1993 John B. Tenney, Pro Se, filed a Motion for 
a New Trial and supporting memorandum. Also, on July 26, 1993 the 
Salt Lake Legal Defender Association was appointed to represent Mr. 
Tenney in any subsequent proceedings. On August 4, 1993, the State 
of Utah filed a response to Tenney's Motion for a New Trial. 
The undersigned herein stipulate and waive a hearing on 
Tenney's Motion for a New Trial and request that the Court decide 
Tenney's Motion for a New Trial based upon the memorandum and 
Affidavits filed in the above-referenced case. 
DATED this ///A day of August, 1993. 
vA*1 &• ^J<2-*Z^z^>=) 
N B. TENNEY 
fendant 77 
CC807 
DATED this // day of Augus 
ITRICK ^. ANDERSON 
Attorney for John B. Tenney 
&*£L iCJr>(eO 
CHARLENE BARLOW 
Attorney for State of Utah 
MAILED/DELIVERED a copy of the foregoing to the Office of 
Charlene Barlow, Attorney Generals Office, 236 State Capitol, Salt 
Lake City, Utah 84114, this day of August, 1993. 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH 
VS 
TENNEY, JOHN B 







CASE NUMBER 921901056 FS 
DATE 10/06/93 
HONORABLE TYRONE E. MEDLEY 
COURT REPORTER 
COURT CLERK STH 
DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR A NEW TRIAL IS SUBMITTED TO THE 
COURT FOR DECISION WITHOUT HEARING BASED UPON THE STIPULATION OF 
THE PARTIES. THE COURT HAVING RECEIVED ALL MEMORANDA IN SUPPORT 
OF AND IN OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR A NEW TRIAL, 
COMES NOW AND RULES AS FOLLOWS: 
1. DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR A NEW TRIAL IS DENIED FOR 
THE REASONS SET FORTH IN PLAINTIFF'S MEMORANDUM IN 
OPPOSITION THEROF. 
2. PLAINTIFF TO PREPARE ORDER. 
CC: CHARLENE,BARLOW 
PATRICK ANDERSON 
M l j W ^ 
CG8C9 
JAN GRAHAM (1231) 
Attorney General 
CHARLENE BARLOW (0212) 
LYNN NICHOLAS (6008) 
Assistant Attorneys General 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
236 State Capitol 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 
Telephone: (801) 538-1331 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, : ORDER 
v. : 
Case No. 921901056 
JOHN B. TENNEY, : 
Judge Tyrone Medley 
Defendant. : 
This matter came before the Court on defendant's motion 
for new trial. The parties submitted memoranda in support of and 
in opposition to the motion and stipulated that the matter should 
be decided on the memoranda. 
THE COURT, having been fully advised in the premises/ 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED: 
Defendant's motion for a new trial is denied for the 
following reasons: 
1. The juror, Dr. Richard Barnett, may have violated 
rule 17(j), Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, by briefly 
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conversing with another doctor about defendant's business 
practices; however, that action does not justify a mistrial. 
2. Dr. Barnett's actions did not indicate that he had 
formed an opinion or bias against defendant; neither was there 
any indication that the actions would impact on the juror's 
deliberation in the case. 
Defendant is hereby notified pursuant to rule 22, Utah 
Rules of Criminal Procedure, that he has thirty days from the 
date this order is signed to take an appeal in this matter. 
3 , . ^ v**^.1^ DATED this day of Oclubei, 1993. 
BY THE COURT: 





CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on this j\j day of October, 1993, I 
caused a true and correct copy of the foregoing to be hand-
delivered to the following: 
Patrick Anderson, Esq. 
Richard G. Uday, Esq. 
SALT LAKE LEGAL DEFENDER ASSOCIATION 
424 East 500 South, Suite 300 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
with a copy sent by U.S. Mail, postage pre-paid, and addressed as 
follows: 
John B. Tenney, defendant pro se 
Salt Lake County Jail 
437 South 200 East 






TUESDAY, SEPTEMBER 6. 199-3 
P R O C E E D I N G S 
THE COURT: This is case No. 921901056. The 
matter of State of Utah vs. John B. Tenney. Counsel, 
would you identify yourselves. 
MS. BARLOW: Charlene Barlow and Lynn Nicholas 
on behalf of the state. Your Honor. 
MR. UDAY: And, Your Honor, on behalf of Mr. 
Tenney, Rich Uday and Rob Heineman from our appellate 
division. 
THE COURT: Where are we on this matter, Mr. 
Uday? 
MR. UDAY: Your Honor, I believe we are 
prepared to stipulate to the majority of the restitution 
that is owed in this issue. The remaining issue comes 
down to restitution owed one individual, Mr. Zieglowsky, 
and I believe how we would prefer to proceed this morning 
is have the state proffer what their evidence would be. 
We would proffer what ours would be and we have a legal 
issue to a disputed perhaps $19,000 and we would ask the 
Court to resolve that legal issue based on stipulated 
testimony rather than taking evidence. 
THE COURT: Why don't we go ahead then and 
place the issues on the record that are stipulated to 
that don't call for a decision on my part. 
n o Q n r; 
1 MR. UDAY: If you will, I am going to defer to 
2 counsel to do that. Your Honor. 
3 MS. BARLOW: Your Honor, we have prepared a 
4 Schedule of Restitution. There were nine people who 
5 testified as to checks that they handed over to Mr. 
6 Tenney and did not receive any money in return. There 
7 are other people who testified that they had handed over 
8 money but they got their monev* back, and we have not 
9 included those, but I have a Schedule of Restitution I 
10 will present to the Court. This is the names, the 
11 address and amounts owing to these nine people which 
12 total up to $53,950. I believe there is no dispute as to 
13 that because those were cancelled checks that were 
14 introduced into evidence of money that was paid over to 
15 Mr. Tenney and never recovered. 
16 THE COURT: Mr. Uday, is it an accurate 
17 statement that the victims listed on this Schedule of 
18 Restitution, handed to me by Ms. Barlow, is the 
19 stipulation that you and Mr. Tenney are agreeing should 
20 encompass at least the substantial portion of the 
21 restitution order which would total $53,950? 
22 MR. UDAY: That is correct. Your Honor. 
23 THE COURT: Let's move forward then and let me 
24 ask Mr. Tenney. Mr. Tenney, this is the stipulation you 
25 are entering into as well, sir? 
ir^TTF" 
1 MR. TENNEY: Yes, it is. Your Honor. 
2 THE COURT: Let's move forward with Mr. 
3 Zieglowskv's case. 
4 MS. BARLOW: Your Honor, I have here a 
5 Memorandum in Support of Restitution that has been 
6 prepared by Lynn Nicholas, mv co-counsel for the state in 
7 this matter, which will help perhaps in laving out Mr. 
8 Zieglowsky"s situation. 
9 As the Court may recall from trial, Mr. 
10 Zieglowsky testified that he and Mr. Tenney entered into 
11 an Exchange Agreement. There were three tracts of land, 
12 three parcels of land property that Mr. Zieglowsky had, 
13 and he turned over these three tracts of land to Mr. 
14 Tenney, minus the indebtedness, for purposes of obtaining 
15 stock, and approximately 33,000 shares of stock. And 
16 this is the issue that is before this Court todav and 
17 we'll proffer what Mr. Zieglowsky's testimony would be 
18 about what had happened to these three tracts of land, 
19 and then make our argument about the amount that we feel 
20 is still owing on these tracts of land. 
21 The first tract of land was a piece of property 
22 I that in the Exchange Agreement signed by Mr. Tenney and 
23 Mr. Zieglowsky in January of 1988, they agreed, and Mr. 
24 Zieglowsky will testify, that that agreement is based 
25 upon appraisals that were done at the time. All of the 
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figures we are talking about here as values of the land 
were based on appraisals at the time. And this agreement 
is that tract one had the value of $75,000. At the time 
there was $27,000 owing to another party on this tract of 
land. This piece of property, tract No. 1, has a long 
and varied history and I will get into that a little bit 
later. 
The second tract of land, the agreement based 
on appraisals, was the value of the property was $42,800, 
with an amount owing to First Security Financial of 
$29,400. 
The third tract of land is a piece of property 
that was given over to Mr. Tenney but then in a 
subsequent agreement the property was given back, was 
deeded back or however it was transferred back and there 
was no loss at all on tract No. 3. So really we are not 
talking about tract No. 3 here. It is a piece of land 
that Mr. Zieglowsky handed over. He obtained it back. 
Handed the stock back in return for this third tract of 
land. So tract 3 is really not at issue. 
The first tract of land, Mr. Zieglowsky will 
testify and we have documents that are attached to the 
memorandum that has been handed to you that will support 
this, the Exchange Agreement is attached to the 
memorandum. In that Exchange Agreement Mr. Zieglowsky 
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handed over this piece of property. The agreement was 
that Mr. Tenney would refinance this piece of property 
which is valued at $75,000, would pay the Lautens, the 
other people who held a mortgage on this piece of land, 
would pay them $20,000 and give them 1400 shares of 
Cellwest for the other 7,000 that was owing to them. The 
Lautens then agreed to accept -20,000 cash and $7,000 
worth of Cellwest stock. 
When Mr. Tenney went to refinance that land and 
get that money, he asked for $48,000. That is what he 
asked the bank for. He was then going to pay $20,000 to 
the Lautens and the other 28,000 would be used for 
Cellwest, for his own personal use. We don't know. 
There is an agreement that is also attached to the 
memorandum that states that the agreement was dated as of 
January 29, 1988. And in this agreement Mr. Tenney and 
Mr. Zieglowsky agreed that Ogden First Federal, which is 
the bank that Mr. Tenney was trying to get the money 
from, would not give him money. Would not refinance his 
property because Tenney had filed a Chapter 7 Bankruptcy. 
The bank did agree to refinance the property if Tenney 
had a co-signer and Mr. Zieglowsky agreed to be a co-
signer. That would be his testimony. 
It would also be his testimony that although he 
* 
agreed to be the co-signer, he ended up being the only 
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person who signed the note. Mr. Tenney never did sign 
it, so it left Mr. Zieglowsky responsible for the note 
which was approximately $48,000. 
In this agreement it states that Tenney would 
be the beneficiary of 100 percent of the proceeds from 
the refinancing and agreed to make every payment due 
under the refinancing. Mr. Zieglowsky agreed to become 
the co-signer only on the basis that Tenney accepted full 
responsibility for all payments, since Zieglowsky would 
not receive any cash consideration for co-signing. 
Tenney agreed to give Zieglowsky certain shares of stock 
in Cellwest and New Generation. Zieglowsky agreed to 
collect the rents. There was a rental property. I 
believe it was a three-unit rental property. Zieglowsky 
agreed to collect the rents and make the payments for one 
year and his testimony would be that that is what he did. 
For one year after the signing of this agreement, he 
collects the rents, he made the payments to the bank. 
The agreement was that thereafter Tenney would assume the 
responsibility to collect the rents and make the 
payments. I think those are the most significant 
agreement terms that are in this agreement that was 
January 29, 1988. 
Mr. Zieglowsky will testify that he co-signed 
the note, although it turned out that Mr. Tenney never 
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signed it. Subsequently, he ended up the only signature 
on the note. He collected the rents for one year and 
paid the payments for one year, and Tenney was to assume 
that responsibility. Mr. Zieglowsky walked awav from it 
at that point. His testimony would be that he was then 
informed subsequently, I am not sure of the date, that 
the bank was going to foreclose on his property because 
payments had not been made after Mr. Zieglowskv made the 
last payments. He said he went to the property, one of 
the units was vacant. He walked in and there found the 
letter from the bank indicating that future payments, 
rent payments, were to be made directly to the bank. 
It is Mr. Zieglowsky's testimony that he 
checked with people who were living there and found that 
they were not making rental payments. Were basically 
living there rent-free. The bank was not getting paid 
and the bank informed Mr. Zieglowsky the property was in 
foreclosure. In order to redeem the property from 
foreclosure, Mr. Zieglowsky paid the bank approximately 
$6,000 and I believe this was in 1991. So he paid $6,000 
to redeem it from foreclosure. A foreclosure caused by 
the fact that Mr. Tenney did not assume the 
responsibility he had agreed to assume. 
He also then owed instead of $27,000 on the 
property, at the time of the assumption Tie owed $46,691 
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and some-odd cents. So our contention on that first 
piece of property is that Mr. Tenney as restitution owes 
the $6,000 that Mr. Zieglowsky had to pay because of the 
redeeming from foreclosure. And also Mr. Tenney ought to 
pay the balance or the difference between the 27,000 that 
was originally owing and the $46,700 approximately that 
was owing at the time he took over the property, which is 
a total of $19,700. $19,700. 
I believe in our memorandum we put 19,600. We 
rounded down that $91, instead of rounding up that $91. 
The Court can determine whether it is 600 or 700. 
THE COURT: Where in the memorandum is that 
located, Ms. Barlow? 
MS. BARLOW: It is page three, I believe. 
THE COURT: Okay, go ahead. 
MS. BARLOW: So our argument is on tract No. 1, 
Mr. Tenney owes Mr. Zieglowsky 25,000 and either 6 or 
$700, depending on whether you round it up or round it 
down. That is based on, Ms. Nicholas has gone about it 
one way and subtracting it and getting the equity and I 
have arrived at the same figure from a different 
direction. The way I arrived at it is the $6,000 that 
Mr. Zieglowsky had to pay to redeem the property and the 
difference between the indebtedness at the time he handed 
the property over, before the refinancing, and the 
B 
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indebtedness at the time he received the property back, 
the difference being the $19,600. You add those together 
it is 25,600, and that is the state's argument on the 
first property. 
The second piece of property, tract No. 2, at 
the time it was handed over, the value of the property 
was $42,800. There was a balance owing to First Security 
Financial of 29,400. That meant there was an equity of 
about $13,400 in Mr. Zieglowsky's behalf. That property 
was lost. Mr. Zieglowsky did not know it went into 
foreclosure. We have a Quitclaim Deed in which the 
property was turned over, a copy of the Quitclaim Deed 
that turned the property over to Mr. Tennev. Mr. 
Zieglowsky had nothing further to do with that property 
after he turned it over. 
The bank was not paid. The bank foreclosed and 
the property was lost. Mr. Zieglowsky did not know about 
it in time. He was not given any notice of the 
foreclosure. He was not able to redeem the property. 
I think that the state can make an argument 
that there is one of two ways of looking at what Mr. 
Zieglowsky lost there. He either lost, at the very 
least, he lost $13,400 because that is his equity at the 
time he turned the property over. The property was gone 
and he never received his equity. He received Cellwest 
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stock which was and is worthless. 
The other argument that I think could be made, 
although this calls for speculation to a certain extent, 
is that had he not turned that property over to Mr. 
Tenney, had it not been foreclosed, he would have the 
opportunity of making the payments on this and eventually 
owning the full amount of the property. So that the 
argument could be made, although I agree that this is a 
tenuous argument, that the full 42,800 is what he lost: 
but that is asking for speculation that he would have 
made the payments and that eventually he would have owned 
it free and clear and sold it for that amount. The very 
least, Mr. Tenney owes Mr. Zieglowsky $13,400 for the 
second tract of property. 
Based on that proffer of evidence, which is 
mixed in, I recognize with my arguments on the values, 
the state feels that the restitution owing to Mr. 
Zieglowsky from Mr. Tenney is $25,600 for the first tract 
of property; 13,400 for the second tract of property, 
making a total of 39,000 that is owing to Mr. Zieglowsky. 
And that added to the amount owing to the other 
individuals, that is over $92,000. That is the amount of 
restitution that we would ask the Court assess in this 
matter. That is not taking into account the payments 
that Mr. Zieglowsky had to make on the property that he 
10 
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was able to redeem since 1991. We have not figured that 
in at all. 
Unless the Court has any further question, 
that's it. 
THE COURT: I may have a question after Mr. 
Uday finishes. Thank you, Ms. Barlow. 
MR. UDAY: Thank you. Your Honor. Basically, 
our proffer to the Court will be that if Mr. Tenney were 
to take the stand and testify today, that he would 
clarify for the Court that both of these tracts of 
properties we are talking about, tract 1 and 2, are in 
fact rental properties. I believe both are tri-plexes. 
Mr. Tenney would indicate that he, in fact, received from 
Mr. Zieglowsky $20,000 from a loan that Mr. Zieglowsky 
originated with the bank for the purpose of paying off 
the original creditor, I believe, in tract 1. That 
$20,000 is restitution he owes, in fact, to Mr. 
Zieglowsky. 
He would further testify that he did not 
receive, to his knowledge at any time, any title to 
either of those two properties. He certainly did not 
receive the keys to the apartments or any rental 
information from Mr. Zieglowsky and neither did he 
receive any Notice of Foreclosure from the bank in either 
case. He never collected a rent payment, he never had a 
11 
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1 key to the apartment. And, in fact, when Mr. Zieglowsky 
2 walked away from the apartment, as counsel indicated, he 
3 was not given notice that he was to then assume those 
4 responsibilities, nor did he receive the wherewithal to 
5 assume those responsibilities. 
6 He would further indicate for purposes of a 
7 payment schedule for restitution that he is presently 
8 employed at Advantage Mortgage making a gross amount of 
9 $1500 a month. That turns out to be a net of $1350 a 
10 month. The probation department and he have figured out 
11 a $200 a month restitution payment is owed, leaving for 
12 Mr. Tenney and the family of five, $1150 a month income. 
13 The only assets that he has are an '86 Cadillac 
14 that they are sharing between the four licensed drivers. 
15 MR. TENNEY: That is correct. 
16 MR. UDAY: And the second car, that is not 
17 working. Presently needs about $650 worth of 
18 transmission work. That would be Mr. Tenney's testimony 
19 if he were to testify today. 
20 I If the Court would like, I could indicate our 
21 dispute with the 19,000 to Mr. Zieglowsky. 
22 THE COURT: Go ahead, sir. 
23 MR. UDAY: Thank you. Your Honor. Basically, 
24 the other $19,000 that has been talked about by counsel 
25 today, we would argue is not appropriate restitution. In 
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essence, our position would be, Judge, that that amount 
of money would fall into the province of civil 
litigation, if anything at all, and that Mr. Zieglowsky 
should not have the benefit of the Attorney General's 
Office to pursue this claim on his behalf. 
The support we would have for that argument. 
Your Honor, flows from a fairly recent case called "State 
vs. Burton," from the Utah Appellate Court, if I may 
approach. I have handed counsel this case as well. 
In this case briefly, Judge, what occurred was 
a real estate transaction, not unlike the one that 
occurred here. In essence, an individual who could not 
obtain a loan to purchase a property bought the property 
on a Contract of Sale. Where he agreed to pay "A," "A" 
agreed to pay "B," and "BM would in theory pay the 
mortgage company. What happened is "A" paid "B." 
Everything was fine for a while. MB" then did not at one 
point continue in his payment to the mortgage company. 
The mortgage company foreclosed on who was "A" living in 
the home or having possession of the home. "A" then 
sought the services of the County Attorney's Office who 
prosecuted a theft case against MBf" and the Court at 
page 819 of that opinion indicated that they are slow to 
give approval to the broad construction of theft that was 
urged by the state in that particular case. Basically 
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holding that that, in fact, is a civil matter; that the 
contractor that was involved in that situation between 
those parties had obligations that were civil in nature. 
If someone defaulted in that obligation, that the claim 
should have been pursued civilly as a civil remedy, 
rather than a criminal. Clarifying the subsequent case, 
that it is not a question of whether there is another 
remedy, civil versus criminal,* you can't have both in a 
particular case. But that this type of contract dispute 
over real estate property is a civil matter and did not 
include criminal considerations. 
I think closely related to this Burton case is 
the case I recall from, I believe it is the Court of 
Appeals as well. State vs. Robinson, which was an 
individual in Circuit Court, pled guilty to a traffic 
offense, maybe two traffic offenses and relating to an 
automobile accident. One was maybe a speeding or failure 
to make the lane change properly, or something, and no 
driver's license. As part of the guilty plea in that 
case, the Judge ordered 13,000-some-odd dollars 
restitution for the injuries that were suffered by the 
car who was hit by virtue of the traffic violation. The 
Court, after answering some other issues that were 
presented before it, indicated that due process did not 
allow the Court to order restitution in that collateral 
14 
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kind of a question primarily because it did not give the 
offender in that situation a forum in which he could 
dispute perhaps the causation factor or a combination of 
co-negligence. Comparative negligence is what we call 
it. I'm not working in that area of the law, and because 
of that due process, prohibited the Court from ordering 
that amount of restitution. 
I would say that the combination of those two 
cases in this incident ought to clarify for us that Mr. 
Tenney is not responsible for the $19,000. He did not 
have any title or any physical possession of that 
property in any way. He never collected rents, but 
perhaps when Mr. Zieglowsky walked away, that that is 
really what happened. He walked awav and rents were not 
collected by anyone as the state suggested. If that is 
the case, there may be a comparative negligence kind of a 
claim that Mr. Tenney could raise at some point, which 
would then violate due process in this Court for the 
Court to impose that additional amount of restitution 
here. 
Additionally, because there is a contract that 
was signed by these parties and because these are 
collateral issues to the sale of securities which he was 
found guilty for by the jury, I believe that these are 
collateral questions and the Court should not impose that 
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additional $19,000 worth of restitution, and order 20,000 
to Mr. Zieglowsky. Thank you. Your Honor. 
THE COURT: I have a question for you, Mr. 
Uday. First of all, do you have a cite for the Robinson 
case? 
MR. UDAY: I do. It is 860 P2d 979. If I may 
approach. Co-counsel is provided that a copy of that as 
well. Your Honor. 
THE COURT: The other issue I want to raise 
with you, Mr. Uday, and I will give Ms. Barlow a chance 
to respond to that, the jury in this case found Mr. 
Tenney guilty of what amounts to a fraud case for the 
most part. I mean, I recognize the other differences, 
but my concern is this, and I recognize this matter is on 
appeal. 
The restitution statute allows the Court under 
appropriate circumstances to award restitution up to, I 
think, double the amount. That is probably not a 
verbatim quote, but I am wondering if you are aware of 
any cases in the State of Utah that may have cited the 
provision in the restitution statute allowing a trial 
court to award up to double the amount of restitution? 
And if you are aware of such a statute, do you know what 
criteria ought to be met before a Court imposes up to 
double the amount? 
16 
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1 My concerns are the broad aspects of this 
2 particular case and it may in fact be that if double the 
3 amount is appropriate, it may in fact be appropriate 
4 under facts and circumstances where fraud is established, 
5 so to speak. 
6 MR. UDAY: Your Honor, I am not aware of a case 
7 that further defines or broadens the statute itself. 
8 However, in 77-18-1, I believe it is Subsection 3, there 
9 is a Subsection 3-B. I believe the qualifying paragraph 
10 indicates what the Court is to consider in imposing 
11 double, if you desire to do that. In fact, in imposing 
12 restitution at all, the Court may consider factors. That 
13 is why we indicated what Mr. Tenney*s testimony would be 
14 regarding the nature of his ability to pay. I think that 
15 paints a picture there is precious little ability to pay 
16 based on his current situation. 
17 THE COURT: This is the thing that frustrates 
18 me to no end and not ,1ust with Mr. Tenney. This is not 
19 particularly to Mr. Tenney, but what frustrates me to no 
20 end with criminal defendants who end up convicted and 
21 then they get employed, I recognize Mr. Tenney has a 
22 family to support, and those are the factors which I am 
23 obligated to take into consideration. I understand that, 
24 but we have victims out there who are out large sums of 
25 J money, but yet everybody, it seems every defendant, wants 
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to pay it back in very small sums. 
Let me ask you a question about one point. How 
many hours a week does Mr. Tenney work? 
MR. UDAY: My understanding, he works full 
time. 
THE COURT: Is that 40 hours a week? 
MR. TENNEY: That is correct. Your Honor. 
THE COURT: Now, tell me why Mr. Tenney should 
not be held to a standard of working more than 40 hours a 
week
 t1ust for a limited duration for the sole purpose of 
paying restitution in this case so it won't take a 
lifetime to get these victims paid off? 
MR. UDAY: I think the Court's position is well 
taken and, in fact, the Court should know that Mr. Tenney 
does not disagree with that position. But one of the 
subsequent issues we want to present to the Court today 
circles around his probation. 
He is now on ISP, intensive supervised 
provision, which requires a curfew. He has desired to 
have that changed, but wanted me to talk to the Court a 
little bit later. His probation officer is present. 
Part of his concern is that the curfew is doing two 
things that limit his ability to make things right in 
this case. No. 1, it limits his ability to do some 
community service hours the Court has imposed because he 
18 
\j * 0 0 & 
has to be home by 9:00, I believe it is. The other is, 
it has prohibited him from getting a second part-time 
job. 
Now I have talked with his probation officer 
today who is not prepared to recommend that he be removed 
from ISP. He has some concerns and I think we can 
address that later: but in short, the ISP probation 
officer, he can correct me if I am wrong, has indicated a 
willingness to allow both community service and a part-
time job to be done by adjusting the curfew once Mr. 
Tenney is able to show him verification of the community 
service hours and location he intends to work and of the 
part-time job he would intend to engage in. Is that 
correct? 
VOICE: That is correct. 
THE COURT: Let me make a suggestion so you 
will know where I am headed on this point. My No. 1 
priority is going to be on restitution. I am not 
persuaded at all to release Mr. Tenney from the ISP 
requirements for the purpose to complete community 
service. Community service, while important, don't get 
me wrong, is a little bit lower down on the pecking order 
compared to restitution. So I am much more likely to go 
along with relaxing of curfew requirements for the sole 
purpose of maintaining second employment. 
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Assuming Mr. Tenney has no health problems that 
would interfere with a second job, I am trying to think 
of things that could reasonably interfere with a second 
job that this Court would find acceptable. Mavbe health 
concerns is one point. Other than that, I think I 
mentioned this at the time of sentencing. I don't think 
this is new. Forty hours to me is not enough, to be 
honest with you. I dust don't see it that way. 
Furthermore, Mr. Uday, and I recognise I am 
changing gears here and I am going to ask Ms. Barlow the 
same thing, I want you to take a look at — I want you to 
research the point to determine whether or not there are 
cases in other jurisdictions, if none exist in the State 
of Utah, that possibly have similar restitution statutes 
that allow for imposing up to double the amount. I do 
want that issue researched. So I am going to ask that 
you locate some cases in that regard so I can have some 
guidance on that point. 
MR. UDAY: We would be happy to do that. 
THE COURT: Again, I am going to consider that 
under the circumstances of this case because of the 
nature of this case, basically. And if I were to so 
find, I would commit those findings to writing and spell 
it out. 
MR. UDAY: Perhaps while we are on the record, 
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